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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**



THESIS

ENTRENCHMENT OF THE STATUS QUO
IN THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

by

Lili D. Mann

August 1993

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Entrenchment of the Status Quo
in the
Arab-Israeli Conflict

by

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Captain, United States Air Force
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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ABSTRACT

This study examines those endemic factors which contribute to the entrenchment of the status quo in the Arab-Israeli conflict. By removing the dynamics of the Cold War, the particular circumstances of the main actors-- Israel, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Syria, the United States and the United Nations--become apparent. It is the thesis of this paper that the underlying causes in the creation and perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict include (1) the importance of ideology and security to Israel, (2) a lack of political will among the players to alter the status quo, (3) a plethora of systemic organizational constraints, and (4) limitations faced by the UN that inhibit its usefulness as an intermediary. While compelling arguments should move the actors toward a resolution of the conflict, particularly when a window of opportunity now exists in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the factors cited above comprise powerful counterforces which both serve to sustain Israel's de facto borders and provide a pretext for Arab hostility.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Why aren't Arabs and Israelis seeking an end to their conflict, particularly when there are compelling social, economic and national security reasons for each side to do so? Why do they continue in an uneasy state of war in which neither side could possibly win? Why have the United States and the United Nations been ineffective as intermediaries?

In seeking answers to those questions, this paper addresses the factors which have contributed to the present state of affairs. Historical antecedents and current dynamics are used to illustrate the fact that there are rational and equally compelling reasons which have entrenched the region in the status quo, thus perpetuating the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This research was conducted using Israel as the focal point for Israel controls the territories in question and is thus, integral to any solution based on a "land for peace" formula. In this regard, the paper first examines the millennium of ideology and security, which have shaped the identity of the Jewish people in the past and which will continue to guide the direction of Israelis into the next century.

Zionist ideology not only transformed Europe's subservient *Ostjuden* into the more militant pioneers who

settled the Yishuv (pre-state Israel), it also created the political movement which culminated with Israel's statehood. Yet the twin pillars of Zionism and national security have exacerbated Israel's relations with Arabs and Palestinians, just as they have been strengthened when confronted with hostile Arab rhetoric and behavior.

The dynamics of ideology and security have prompted certain actions and reactions, but more passive factors have played an equally important role. The first of these is a lack of political will to change the status quo. Despite the military costs of occupation, Israel derives considerable economic and strategic benefits from the territories and continues to enjoy normal trade and diplomatic relations with the world at large. For Syria's president Hafez al-Asad, the conflict may have, in fact, enhanced his domestic and regional clout because he has been able to exploit anti-Zionist sentiments.

The PLO has not been able to present a viable political force, being hampered by the geographic dispersion of Palestinians, internal political fragmentation, and failure of the *intifada*. Even the US has demonstrated only sporadic and reactionary interest in Arab-Israeli affairs, since its national security requirements in the region have been satisfied through a careful balance of alliances. Additionally, competing issues and problems, both in the US

and abroad, have detracted from any sustained attention in the Levant.

Organizational constraints add to the entrenchment of the status quo. Israel's parliamentary system perpetuates coalition politics, with little room for outside inputs, innovation or change. Likewise, Israel's military is able to defend the political decisions of its leaders and maintain control of Israel's de facto borders. And the PLO has been a weak counterforce, due to internal division and lack of astute leadership. On the other hand, the political power of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee has strengthened American-Israeli ties and buttressed Israel's position vis a vis the Arabs and Palestinians.

The United Nations has had limited effectiveness as an intermediary in the Arab-Israeli conflict, hampered by the veto power of members of the Security Council, and financial dependency upon the US. The organization has also faced juridical constraints as issues regarding national sovereignty have been difficult to resolve. The interpretation and legality of UN resolutions comprise another area of contention, with opposing Arab and Israeli viewpoints.

So the entrenchment of the status quo continues, despite compelling arguments for increased national security, regional stability and economic growth. The Arab-Israeli

conflict drags on, even though a window of opportunity for peace exists after the end of the Cold War and the unique alliances that were formed during Desert Storm. Even as the Mideast peace talks reach another stalemate, the forces perpetuating the Arab-Israeli conflict may be producing the most substantive results to date.

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is in the minds of men that peace must be constructed.

UNESCO Constitution

The Middle East peace talks are now completing their second year of negotiations. But while hope yet remains for a settlement with regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is truly unfortunate that one of the most tangible achievements to date is still simply that the "Israelis and Arabs are meeting face-to-face."¹

Successful negotiations have always been a difficult art, and nowhere is this more true than in the Middle East. In fact, Arab and Israeli negotiators have a great task ahead of them as they try to disentangle themselves from the many years of war and bloodshed that form the legacy of Britain's contradictory pledges to support both Arab and Jewish national aspirations (in return for their support in World War I). Indeed, the intransigence of each side is mired in mutually exclusive tenurial claims while at the same time the problem is exacerbated by their physical presence and spiritual attachment to the land of Palestine.

¹Crossette, 1992.

Because Israel controls the territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, it naturally forms a central focus of analysis for this work. But more precisely, Why has Israel been unwilling to relinquish the occupied territories? Why have the other key players-- Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the US--been unable to overcome Israel's political stance and how have they prolonged the conflict? What embeds them in the status quo? And, finally, what are the factors which have contributed to the current state of affairs?

II. MILLENNIUM OF IDEOLOGY AND SECURITY

The Jewish people lived for centuries united by religion, then lived united by anti-Semitism. Now it lives united by the danger to Israel.

Washington Jewish Week

Despite compelling arguments for peace, the participants have been unable to demonstrate the resolve needed to erect a political solution because stronger counterforces have prevailed. The most important of these are ideology and security, both of which play central roles in the formation of Israeli foreign policy.

The vitality of these two issues is derived from the religious and secular experiences of the Jews since their beginnings as a people. That they continue to serve as guidelines for present day actions results no less from their importance to Jewish life than it does from Arab hostility toward Israel.

A. ISRAELI IDEOLOGY

Normative Zionism laid claim to the territory of biblical Israel although the question of boundaries was never clearly defined in the Bible and was made even more confusing by the territorial expansions and contractions of Hebrew

sovereignty in ancient Israel. What makes the Zionist movement unique from other national movements is its basis in divine promise (Genesis 15:18): "Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates." However, the Bible failed to specify where land boundaries would intersect these rivers and it also contained differing promises. For example, the divine promise in Numbers (34:2), though replete with landmarks which have since disappeared, is generally accepted by scholars to represent sharply circumscribed borders in comparison to that promised to Abraham in Genesis.¹

If actual historical settlements are considered, the borders of the Israeli kingdoms varied over thousands of years, but its core comprised present day Jerusalem and the West Bank. This area is considered the holiest in the Land of Israel. In fact, rabbinical homilies have underscored the close ties between Jews and the land of Palestine, asserting that to live in the Land of Israel outweighs all other religious commandments and that he who resides in the Land remains without sin.²

The idea of partitioning Palestine into Arab and Jewish states arose following the Arab revolt in 1936 and was formalized in the 1937 Peel Commission Report. Acceptance

¹Isaac, 1976, pp. 20-44.

²"Gevulot Haaretz", 1976.

of the recommendation for partition was debated among Zionist leaders, not because they disagreed that all of Palestine belonged to Jews by right, but because they disagreed over the tactical wisdom of accepting a fraction of the whole while forfeiting the rest.³ Some of these dissenting voices, in particular Judah Leon Magnes (1877-1948) and Martin Buber (1878-1965), doubted that a Jewish state could be established peacefully in Palestine and believed that the implementation of a binational state comprised of Jews and Arabs was the only politically viable solution. Ultimately, history has shown that precedence was given to partitioning as a result of the political activities of mainstream Zionist supporters who advocated such a policy.

Despite such internal controversies, however, Zionism provided a constant source of ideological direction for the founding fathers of Israel and later generations of statesmen though, for Arabs in the Middle East, Zionism obstructed the emergence of Palestinian nationalism.

1. Zionism as a Basis for Jewish Fulfillment

Secular Zionism originated in the late nineteenth-century Europe as a nationalist movement. It provided a viable reaction to a series of violent European pogroms

³Isaac, 1976, p. 33.

against Jews,⁴ and provided a reply to the failure of assimilation as propounded by the adherents of Jewish Enlightenment, the *Haskaleh*, who sought to alter the political and social status of the Jew.⁵ Leo Pinsker's *Auto-Emancipation* (1882) was considered the "first great statement that the torment of the Jew" drove him "to assert his own nationalism because the wider world rejected him."⁶

Essentially, Zionism envisioned the cultural and social fulfillment of Jews and their ingathering into a safe haven, and propounded that anti-Semitism would be eliminated once Jews established their own state and became a nation like all other nations of the world. Yet, despite these expectations, the basis of Zionist ideology continues to divide both Israelis and Arabs.⁷

Although largely a secular movement, Zionism revived an old ideology, the *Return to Zion*, which had "permeated

⁴The pogroms of 1881 led to Pinsker's *Auto-Emancipation* (1882); and the Dreyfus Affair in 1894 was a catalyst for Theodor Herzl who put forth his solution in *Der Judenstaat* (the Jewish State), published in 1896. Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish officer in the French army who was charged and convicted of spying for the Germans, although he was later exonerated. The extent of anti-Semitism unleashed by the trial led Herzl to believe assimilation was impossible. (Lewis, 1990, p. 25; Hertzberg, 1972, pp. 179-181, 201-203)

⁵Metz, 1990, p. 24; Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 265-266.

⁶Hertzberg, 1972, p. 181.

⁷Isaac, 1976, pp. 20-21; Kohn, 1970, pp. 278-284; Metz, 1990, pp. 24-26.

Jewish thinking since the earliest days of the Diaspora"⁸ and which had also been kept alive for over 2,000 years through Judaic ritual and prayer. And while modern Zionism shifted the responsibility for the ingathering from the Messiah to the Jews themselves--a heretical thought according to orthodox rabbis--it nevertheless acquired religious undertones as it ultimately called for the reestablishment of Jews in their ancient homeland, a reunion that would bring forth not only Jewish, but world redemption.⁹

2. Zionism as a Basis for Arab Hostility

The manner in which Zionism was executed was to inextricably draw Jews and Arabs living in Palestine into conflict with one another, a situation initiated by Great Britain because of its contrary promises as contained in the Balfour Declaration and the Hussein-McMahon Letters.¹⁰

⁸Dimont, 1962, p. 393.

⁹Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 265; Buber, 1976.

¹⁰From 1915 to 1917, a series of 10 letters were exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's high commissioner in Egypt, and Sherif Hussein of Mecca, Prophet Muhammad's most prominent living descendent and guardian of Islam's holy sites. Britain pledged to support Arab nationalism if the Arabs revolted against the Turks. But whether the area of Palestine was included in the area in which Britain would recognize Arab independence remains controversial. The British Balfour Declaration of 1917 declared favorable government disposition toward "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" which would not "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." (Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 267, 269)

To begin with, the Zionists exhibited a naive lack of consideration for Arab sensitivities. Theodor Herzl, one of the founders of the movement, paid little attention to the Arab community within which Zionism was to be established,¹¹ yet he worked to secure the political support of outside actors such as the Ottomans and the British.

Others, such as Judah Magnes or Ahad Ha'Am, who did express concern regarding the impact upon Arabs, were usually ignored. This was primarily due to beliefs among mainstream Zionists (including Max Nordau and Herzl) that modern agricultural methods and industry could accommodate both populations, and also that Jewish immigration would benefit Arabs by increasing their orange exports and by providing profits from land sales. In short, Arabs and Jews would share the land peaceably.¹²

But opposing this view was Vladimir Jabotinsky, the founder of a more militant and expansionist Zionism known as *Revisionism*, who, in the early twentieth century, was the only leading Zionist to perceive the Arab-Israeli situation as a winner-take-all, or zero-sum game.¹³

Inflaming the situation in those early years were Zionist efforts to change their lifestyle and image from the

¹¹Tetlie, 1970, pp. 1-5.

¹²Ibid.; Laqueur, 1972, p. 225.

¹³Schechtman, 1970, p. 325; Seliktar, 1983, p. 122.

passive Ostjuden, who engaged in middle-man trades, to a people who worked the land and could be regarded by others as tough and self-sufficient. Consequently, the pioneers from the *Second Aliyah* (ascent or immigration) of 1904-1914 and onward, who established communal Jewish agricultural communities, refrained from such earlier practices as sharing pastureland with the surrounding Arab populace, using Arab labor, or resorting to bribery to placate Arab demands.¹⁴

The first influx of tens of thousands of Jews in the early 1900s also provoked Palestinian hostility for many of the same reasons new immigrants are resented anywhere: peasants were afraid of change, shopkeepers and professional men feared competition, and religious dignitaries rejected opposing doctrinal schools of thought.¹⁵ An economic conflict arose between Jews and Christian Arabs, with the latter inciting Moslems to full-scale pogroms to drive out their economic rivals. Cultural differences exacerbated ethnic tensions; neither side cared to learn about the other, and each held in contempt the other's lifestyle.¹⁶

¹⁴Laqueur, 1972, pp. 228, 232, 234, 237; Arian, 1985, p. 14.

¹⁵Laqueur, 1972, p. 245.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 227, 237.

The mutual tendency toward isolation and separation was encouraged with the advent of British and United Nations (UN) partitioning plans and remains an integral aspect of the existing Arab-Israeli conflict. Walter Laqueur writes that the Arabs feared the Jews would "become masters of the country" while they themselves "would be reduced to the status of a minority." The anticipation of conflict and possible Jewish dominion over Palestine was sensed more correctly by the Arabs than the Zionists, who "were all basically pacifists" and who thought they could "establish a state without bloodshed."¹⁷

In retrospect, Arab apprehension seems justified. Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first president, called for Arab population transfers¹⁸ and the large-scale immigration of Jews in order to make Palestine "as Jewish as England is English." And while the Arabs might have initially accepted the idea of a Jewish presence on religious or cultural grounds, they could not accept their displacement as a "convenience to largely secular Jewish interests."¹⁹

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 239, 245.

¹⁸Mainstream Zionists such as Herzl and Aaron David Gordon, the father of Labor Zionism, espoused gradual displacement (Patai and Zohn, 1960, pp. 88-89). Jabotinsky favored explicit plans for the removal of Arabs (Gordon, 1970, p. 25).

¹⁹Weizmann quoted in Taylor (1970, pp. 8, 12).

The Zionist dream of a Jewish homeland in Palestine exacerbated Arab hostility because it impeded their own nationalist aspirations. Arab subjects of the Ottomon empire were introduced to the concept of popular rights during Napoleon's military foray into the Middle East, which began with his expedition to Egypt in 1798. Emboldened by the success of national liberation movements in the Ottomon Empire as successive Balkan Christian states gained their independence, and as a reaction to the rise of pan-Turanism, Arab nationalism emerged in Palestine after 1908 and reverberated throughout the empire as Arabs revolted against their Turkic rulers during World War I.

While the Arab movement presented a competing political force in Palestine, the Zionists failed to give it any import as it was small and marked by fairly weak and factionalized leadership.²⁰ More importantly, competing political ambitions made the potential for a binational state implausible. Martin Buber correctly observed that Jewish and Arab cooperation might have been possible in Palestine had not "the political element, that same desire to achieve more than what [was] truly needed, been active on both sides."²¹

²⁰Laqueur, 1972, p. 244.

²¹Buber, 1983, p. 198.

Arab alarm that Zionist realization of the prophetic Messianic Kingdom would stretch "from the Nile to the Euphrates" continue to be inflamed by recurring Zionist proposals for Israeli expansion. Oded Yinon's essay (1982), "A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties," is regarded by the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) as the "most explicit, detailed and most unambiguous statement to date" of the Zionist endeavor to exploit the internal self-destructive forces in the Arab Moslem world so as to attain the eventual dissolution of Arab states. The AAUG regards Israel's actions in the 1948 War of Independence and the Six-Day War as directed toward the displacement of Palestinians and views Israel's invasions into Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 as further evidence of Zionist imperialism.²²

Israel's political-military strategy of peripheral encirclement and its annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, both of which fell to Israel in the 1967 war, have heightened such Arab fears.²³ Ironically though, such plans stemmed in large part from inherent Israeli insecurities regarding their survival in a hostile Arab environment; to wit, the fear that by not taking action the Jews would

²²Nakhleh 1982; Shahak, 1982.

²³The Golan Heights was annexed in December 1981, East Jerusalem in 1967 and reaffirmed in 1980 (Metz, 1990, p. xvi).

"cease to exist within any borders."²⁴ Indeed, the question over borders may ultimately jeopardize Israel's security because of Arab determination to delimit those boundaries. Truly, it is this core issue that is the most crucial and most intractable area of disagreement within the Middle East peace talks today.

3. New Zionism

Another serious challenge to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the emergence of *New Zionism* after the 1967 War. The principles of New Zionism derive from the right-wing doctrines of the earlier Revisionists who claimed the right to both sides of the Jordan River and appreciated the utility of militant action. New Zionism currently incorporates both secular and religious elements, and its adherents, supported by Likud and former members of the Labor party, oppose any return to pre-1967 borders.²⁵

Of significance, this movement is based on traditional principles of Zionism and links the state of Israel to world Jewry: "A great Aliyah from all the

²⁴Yinon, 1982, p. 10.

²⁵New Zionism includes the secular *Land of Israel* movement and the *Ein Vered Circle*. The former was begun by past Labor leaders and the latter is comprised of *kibbutz* (communal farms) and collective settlements. *Gush Emunim* represents the religious component, which was officially founded in 1974 in protest against the return of territories demanded by Dr. Henry Kissinger's peace initiative. (Weissbrod, 1982, pp. 266-267; Seliktar, 1983, pp. 120-121; Isaac, 1976, pp. 6, 13-19, 46-48)

diasporas of the Jewish people is the fundamental condition for preserving the national character of Eretz Yisrael" (Land of Israel).²⁶

Also, the twin goals of aliyah and settlement are inextricably connected: "The settlement of the entire land required the aliyah of the world's Jews, and the world's Jews need the entire land to provide them with the conditions making settlement of millions of additional immigrants possible."²⁷

Inasmuch as governmental consideration of land-for-peace once implied that the lands belonged to the Arabs, the Land of Israel movement considers them rightfully Israel's, justified on religious grounds, historical tenure, existentialism, and fulfillment of Zionist ideology. Just as importantly, it called for government recognition of Israel's predominance in the region after the 1967 war. Israel could now readjust "its ideological perspectives to its power resources"²⁸ while laying claim to the occupied territories on the ideological precedent of New Zionism.

The religious component of New Zionism, *Gush Emunim*, has been associated with settlement activity in the Arab

²⁶Quote from the Land of Israel Movement Manifesto, quoted in Isaac (1976, p. 66).

²⁷Ibid., pp. 66-67.

²⁸Ibid., p. 67.

areas of the occupied territories. And while secular Zionism justified the Return to Zion and the wars against Arabs as a lack of choice, Gush Emunim "justifies itself by faith and positive volition."²⁹ It offers an explicit religious claim to the territories regarding their settlement activity as the fulfillment of God's Law, whereby Jews, by proving themselves the exclusive proprietors of Eretz Yisrael, can hasten the Redemption, which they believe is currently unfolding.³⁰

Consequently, Gush Emunim leaders have fought against an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories through the positive action of settlement and the threat of civil war should they be stopped. Their doctrine underscores both the special mission of Jews as *God's Chosen People* and the acceptance of Balaam's curse of isolation, which they interpret as a blessing, an indication of the "paramount moral imperative and *raison d'être* of Israel's international existence."³¹

²⁹Porat, 1982.

³⁰Weissbrod, 1982, pp. 268-269; Seliktar, 1983, p. 125; Isaac, 1976, pp. 61-62.

³¹Seliktar, 1983, pp. 127-129; Balaam's curse (Numbers 23:9): ". . . Lo, a people dwelling alone and not reckoning itself among the nations!"

4. Zionism as an Arab Counterforce

In countering Arab arguments, the traditional intransigence of the Israeli negotiating position has been buttressed by the success of Zionist leaders to decrease the appeal of Arab ideology even while they succeeded in shifting the Israeli government to the right as the PLO's position became more moderate.

The Zionists have also been effective in countering Arab claims to Palestine. In the 1930s Jabotinsky argued before various British commissions that, while Arab nationalism might have legal or moral justification, only the Jewish people had the right to Palestine, not just for reasons of national identification, but because as a people without a state, Palestine represented the sole avenue for physical survival: "When the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation."³²

Additionally, Zionists were able to counter Palestinian prerogatives based on their recency of physical tenure with the counterargument that Jews had occupied Palestine for 1,800 years and Jewish settlement had been continuous for over 3,000 years.³³

³²Quote by Jabotinsky (1972); Isaac, 1976, p. 62.

³³Isaac, 1976, p. 62.

Moreover, even if the Palestinian argument were to be considered, it was made meaningless by the New Zionist introduction of different concepts of time. For whereas the Palestinian justification is based on linear time, the Israelis present the traditional *Talmudic* notion of fused time--fusion of past, present and future--and the restoration of past glory at some point in the future. This concept has significance when it "organizes events as a moral sequence leading to the Redemption."³⁴

Zionist leaders also view Palestinian nationalism as having been artificially contrived in order to block the formation of the state of Israel. According to a ninth-grade Hebrew textbook³⁵:

Only from the year 1959 and onward did these states--especially Egypt, Syria, and Iraq--raise in the meetings of the Arab League . . . the concept of 'the Palestinian entity'. . . in order to strengthen their propaganda against the state of Israel. . . . Israel is the only state in this region whose people . . . [have] lived in the same land, spoken the same language, maintained tradition which has not been severed, and retained the same tie here for 3,000 years.

Former prime minister Golda Meir has associated herself with the above view; in her words³⁶:

³⁴Seliktar, 1983, pp. 124-125.

³⁵*The History of the People of Israel*, 1987.

³⁶Golda Meir stated that view in 1969 (Cobban, 1984, p. 246).

It was not as though there was a Palestinian people . . . and we came and threw them out and took their land away from them. They did not exist.

An Arab holy war has been initiated against Israel. Yet, this too has been countered with the Zionist declaration of their own holy war as they proclaim it the Jewish duty to destroy those who would destroy them, just as God commanded Joshua to destroy the hostile Amalekites in biblical times.³⁷

Zionism may well have been effectively countered by the Arab ideologies of *pan-Islamism* and *pan-Arabism* but for their inability to attract or sustain any degree of Arab unity. Unquestionably, Islamic fundamentalism failed to unite the Middle East, although it gained strength in the 1970s and 1980s by presenting a viable alternative to the failures of Western and Marxist style governments³⁸ and also by recouping traditional values. However, because Islamism spread only slowly it failed to take political root.

The problems exhibited by the Islamic Republic of Iran contributed to that slow spread by illustrating the difficulty in resolving a religious basis of sovereignty with the theoretical basis of popular rule in the nation-state. Internal oppression and unwillingness to compromise

³⁷Seliktar, 1983, p. 127.

³⁸Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, pp. 736-737.

with Iraq for almost a decade in the war of 1980-1988, in Muslim eyes, further discredited the Iranian regime. The most basic obstacle to the spread of Islamism, though, was that it was opposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as by Arab leaders who viewed such political activism as a threat to their internal political power.³⁹

Pan-Arabism also never succeed in uniting the Arab Middle East. Past attempts, notably the Egyptian-Syrian union of 1958-1961, and the announced Federation of Arab Republics in 1971 (to be comprised of Egypt, Libya and Syria) failed because of differences in cultural and social levels, discrepancies in economic wealth, contrasts in ideologies and political structures, and the unwillingness of state leaders to relinquish political power. Furthermore, pan-Arabism and socialism split the Middle East into two distinct camps: in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a revolutionary-radical group comprised of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and South Yemen were aligned against a coalition of opposing monarchies, comprised of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait and other Gulf states, and Morocco.⁴⁰

Despite the rhetoric of pan-Arabism, Arab regimes were often opposed to one other, as in the case of Ba'thist

³⁹Ibid., p. 737; Chelkowski and Pranger, 1988, pp. 77-79, 97-98, 145-146.

⁴⁰Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, p. 738, 758; Lenczowski, 1990a, pp. 755-756, 758, 760-763.

Syria versus Ba'thist Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s. Invariably, national interests had first priority. Witness Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979; and the Palestinian desire for self-autonomy versus accepting absorption into a greater pan-Arab nation; and the import Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states gave to pan-Islamism versus pan-Arabism in order to maintain their separate sovereignties.⁴¹ As Martin Indyk has concluded, Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the divisiveness of the Arab response has finally "shattered the myth of pan-Arab unity"⁴² once and for all.

Another contributing factor to Israel's strong ideological stand has been the shift of PLO tenets from a rejectionist to a more conciliatory stance. This is most clearly evident in the resolutions of the 17th Palestinian National Congress (PNC), which no longer reflect a call for the liberation of "their country" (even if the Palestinian Charter continues to embrace that cause).⁴³

⁴¹Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, p. 738.

⁴²Indyk, 1991/92b, p. 75.

⁴³Mansfield, 1990, p. 477; Seliktar, 1983, p. 132; "The Palestinian National Charter" as revised by the Fourth PNC Meeting, July 1968 (extracts) and cited in Cobban (1984, pp. 267-268). The PLO has tacitly moved away from the Charter by refraining from referring to the Charter in every Palestinian National Convention (PNC) resolution since the 17th PNC (Harkabi, 1987, pp. 43-52).

The PLO's ideological rhetoric was further weakened by Israel's political success, when in 1988, the PLO officially renounced terrorism, acknowledged Israel's right to exist, accepted a two-state solution, and began to acknowledge the separate interests of the Palestinian citizens in Israel.⁴⁴ Indeed, despite the PLO's original intent to wrest the land of Palestine away from Israel, the PLO, today, would be happy to achieve statehood on only a tiny portion of that coveted land.⁴⁵

B. ISRAELI SECURITY

In addition to Zionism, national security has been of equal importance in shaping Israel's foreign policy. As such, it too presents an obstacle to Middle East peace. The historical victimization of Jews, coupled with Israel's encirclement by Arab states, have prompted what may appear to be a paranoic emphasis by Israeli leaders on security. And as will be shown, it has also prompted interpretations of hostile Arab actions as being genocidal, rather than as perhaps being natural reactions to Israeli foreign policy.

1. Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism has been important in molding the Israeli psyche. A complex phenomenon, the prejudice against

⁴⁴Smootha, 1992, pp. 272-273; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155.

⁴⁵Rubin, 1990, p. 138; Qasir, 1992.

Jews has many roots and, indeed, there are at least three religious factors that may elucidate its source:

1. The Jewish rejection of Christ as their Savior (Matthew 27:11-25)
2. Muhammad's claim that the Judaic scriptures had been falsified to conceal the foretelling of his mission as a prophet of God⁴⁶
3. The human jealousy that may have arisen because of the biblical notion that Jews are God's Chosen People (Matthew 1:1-17)

There might also be a psychological basis for anti-Semitism as well. For, as postulated by Leo Pinsker, as a people without a nation, Jews aroused a person's inherited aversion to ghosts, a phenomenon he termed *Judeophobia*. What is more, anti-Semitic feelings may have also stemmed from the relegation of Jews to trades eschewed by others, a stereotype forever immortalized by the Shakespearean character, Shylock.

The ethnic basis of anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Europe and Tsarist Russia⁴⁷ resulted in a series of violent pogroms that reached an apex in the German Holocaust in which almost six million Jews were murdered.⁴⁸ Yet, the ultimate goal of Hitler's death camps--the annihilation of

⁴⁶Farah, 1987, p. 50; Hitti, 1989, pp. 117-118.

⁴⁷Metz, 1990, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁸In 1939, about 10 million of the estimated 16 million Jews in the world lived in Europe. By 1945, almost six million had been killed, most of them in nineteen concentration camps (Ibid., pp. 48-49).

the Jewish race--was thwarted, and like a newly risen phoenix, Jewish hope was reborn through the ideology of Zionism.

But because Israel perceived Western unwillingness to intervene on its behalf during crucial moments (e.g., the Holocaust and the 1967 War), the Israeli people ultimately decided to rely on themselves for their own defense and indeed, to give security priority over all other requirements. According to Mark Lewis, such concerns were used to justify the harshness of their treatment of others; i.e., the dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, the granting of only limited rights to Israel's Arab citizens, and the retaliatory raids against bordering states harboring Palestinian guerrillas.⁴⁹

In fact, the impact of the Holocaust upon Jews, both as individuals and as a race, have been institutionalized through the school curriculum, literature, film, and other socializing agents. They serve as a reminder and a warning for future generations, ultimately to ensure the alertness of their people and the world against a similar atrocity in the future.

Jews have been without question, a persecuted minority throughout their history, and one result of this victimization is that, even after the establishment of their

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 5, 49.

own state, the Israelis today continue to exhibit the tendencies of a "mino-majority" (i.e., a minority recently turned into a majority). As such, their psychological disposition as a people remain "fraught with feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, suspicion and hostility [that are] often associated with the previous minority position."⁵⁰

2. Palestinian Suffering

Even though Israel was established as a haven for Jews, the Israelis continue to be a threatened people. The impact of successive Arab-Israeli wars and countless border conflicts reinforce their apprehension and elicit over-reactions to any behavior that is perceived as threatening,⁵¹ a situation reminiscent of the early Zionist pioneers who preferred to err on the side of toughness rather than exhibit cowardice or weakness toward the local Arab opposition. At the same time, the sheer magnitude of their past suffering and vulnerability has increased the Israeli tendency to discount the pain of others even as they exaggerate the extent of the Arab threat.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, have demanded Israeli recognition for the suffering they have endured as a result of their own diaspora and their persecution at the hands of Israel. And much as the Zionists did with theirs,

⁵⁰Smoocha, 1989, pp. 17-18.

⁵¹Ibid.

the Palestinians seek an end to their exile and a fulfillment of their own nationality as a people (by their return to Palestine). As David Shipler says: "The longing for return [to Palestine] is as integral to the Palestinian nationalism that has evolved since 1948 as it was to the Jewish Zionism that has moved thinkers and activists from the nineteenth century onward."⁵²

But by couching their plight in parallel terms with the Holocaust, the Palestinians have only evoked indignation from a majority of Israelis.⁵³ Abba Eban, for example, a past foreign minister and one of Israel's elder statesman who advocated discussions with the PLO, considers such comparisons as "abrasive." Israeli leaders have taken this one step further by denying the legitimacy of Palestinians as a people. According to Meron Benvenisti, Jews do not deny the existence of Palestinians as individuals, it's just that they don't exist as a community.⁵⁴

Part of the problem in acknowledging a separate Palestinian identity is the lack of distinguishing characteristics between Palestinian Arabs and other Arabs. The Israeli argument on this is that, if the Arabs of the

⁵²Shipler, 1987, p. 54.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 57-63.

⁵⁴Eban, 1989; Benvenisti cited in Shipler (1987, p. 77).

central area of Judea-Samaria-Gaza are a separate people, then so must be the Transjordanian Arabs to the east and the Israeli Galilean Arabs to the west.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Israel's failure to acknowledge the hardship of the Palestinian situation continues to obstruct sincere reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Israeli government has also acted to curtail the manifestation of any distinctive Palestinian identity by outlawing their symbols of nationhood. This includes a ban on the displaying of their flag, the singing of their national song, and even the scrawling of *Palestine* on a wall. In addition, the casualties suffered by Palestinians during Israeli border strikes are often omitted in media reports. For example, the number of Arabs killed during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was reported by the Israeli press, yet the number of Palestinians who died in the refugee camps was excluded even though they were the hardest hit.⁵⁶ So, while these actions may satisfy short-term political utility and security concerns in strengthening Israel's position vis-a-vis the Palestinians, the long-term danger is that the rift between Jews and Arabs is widening even further.

⁵⁵Begin, 1991, p. 23.

⁵⁶Shipler, 1987, p. 74.

For Israel, though, the alternative (acceptance of Palestinian suffering) may be an impossible option. Because as Benvenisti has observed, once the Israelis "accept the symmetry that the other side is also a legitimate national movement, then their own feeling about their own right and legitimacy will be dimmed."⁵⁷ In the end, Anne Roiphe says it may be that the Holocaust has left Israelis so "prone to paranoia," they are unable to imagine "the pain of another's exile" nor "the possibility of another's willingness to change;" thus they are willing to endure "eternal warfare" because they assume the Palestinians would do the same to them.⁵⁸

3. Institutionalized Stereotypes

Not only have the Israelis discounted the suffering and plight of the Palestinians in pursuit of legitimate national security concerns, but the institutionalization of stereotypes by both Arabs and Israelis have increased the radicalization of their respective populations. Certainly, the suffering each side endures as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict may have made the allure of secular or religious radicalization irresistible.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Benvenisti quoted in Shipler (1987, p. 75).

⁵⁸Roiphe, 1987 p. 65.

⁵⁹Heller, 1989/90, pp. 170-171.

And such radicalization of present and future generations of children continues to be promulgated through the tools of socialization. Arab and Israeli stereotypes almost mirror each other. Each smears the other as violent, cruel and bloodthirsty, even down to a derogatory image of the other as being cowardly. These stereotypes, produced after decades of war and terrorism, have become so thoroughly manifested in the "literature, education, history, language and social mores on both sides that," as Shipler observed, "they seem to govern the conflict as much as they are created by it." One ironic manifestation of this radicalization is that PLO extremists strive to preserve the Palestinian refugee camps though the people live there in poverty and in squalor. For there is a fear that, by tearing down the camps "and by integrating into the surrounding Arab cities and farms," the dream of all Palestinians would once and for all be defeated⁶⁰.

The children of successive Palestinian and Israeli generations are indoctrinated from an early age so that they, too, will carry on the torch of conflict. An excerpt from a Palestinian school book reads⁶¹:

⁶⁰Shipler, 1987, pp. 55-56, 182-200.

⁶¹The unnamed elementary school textbook quoted in Shipler (1987, p. 57) was used both in Jordan and surreptitiously in the West Bank.

Palestine is my home and the path of my triumph. . . .
Strange faces are in my stolen land. They are selling my
crops and occupying my home. I know my path and my people
will return. . . .

Certainly, such radicalization continues to
exacerbate relations between Palestinians and Israelis, and
between Arabs and Jews alike. And indeed, the
institutionalization of mutually derogatory stereotypes may
also be considered an adaptive behavior in the face of
almost 50 years of war. If, as many Israelis believe, in
the absence of political and military conflict mutual
prejudice would give way to decent relations and minimal
tensions,⁶² then peace between the descendants of Abraham
may yet be possible.

4. Arab Rhetoric and Behavior

As Muslims, the duty to maintain the struggle until
Palestine (including Jerusalem) is justly returned to its
people, and until Palestine once again "becomes a land where
people of all religions, races and colors can live together
peacefully as they did for more than 1,400 years,"⁶³ may be
regarded as a noble call for harmonious coexistence. Some
Arab actions even represent an implicit recognition of
Israel toward that end; take, for example, their acceptance
of UN Resolution 242, or their enactment of various

⁶²Ibid., p. 182.

⁶³al-Amen, 1991.

confidence building steps,⁶⁴ or their government-sanctioned press descriptions of Israel as a "Hebrew state" versus a "Zionist foe"⁶⁵.

Likewise, Palestinian delegates continue to engage in peace negotiations with Israel, despite their threats to the contrary, and even at great risk to their own lives, for they are regarded by members of Hamas and other extremists as having betrayed the plight of their exiled compatriots.

Yet, while Palestinian decisions and actions have become more moderate, no corresponding changes have been made to their ideology. As a result, Israelis and their supporters readily point out the hostility and aggression contained in official PLO literature directed against Israel. When reading the PLO's National Charter, one is compelled to conclude that the organization would not be able to reach its main objective (liberation of Palestine) without first eliminating Israel's statehood. For example, the charter still advocates an "armed struggle" to "liberate Palestine" (Article 9) and it regards the liberation of Palestine as a "national duty" aimed at "the elimination of Zionism" (Article 15). Also, the major thesis of the PLO

⁶⁴Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have ended the secondary boycott of Israel and have rhetorically joined other UN members in renouncing the UN resolution equating "Zionism as racism" (Indyk, 1991).

⁶⁵As noted in Syrian and Saudi press (Schlesinger, 1991-92).

since its inception has been that of a protracted conflict until the end of time, while, in addition, militant PLO offshoots have taken names reflecting traditional Arab themes of heroism and revenge such as "Heroes of Return" and "Vengeance of Youth."⁶⁶

That Yasir Arafat publicly renounced terrorism in 1988⁶⁷ while in private he continued to tolerate militant behavior toward Israel only served to further destroy PLO credibility even as his antithetical behavior justified the security arguments propounded by Israeli hawks.

The rise of the extremist Muslim organization, Hamas, has also strengthened the position of Israeli hardliners. The organization's agenda is to destroy the state of Israel, which they regard as having been implanted on Muslim holy land, and to create in its stead a state established according to Islamic law where people of all faiths, including Jews, would live. Hamas' recent killings of soldiers next to the Gaza Strip and Hebron and the cruel murder of border patrolman, Nisim Toledano, prompted the Israeli government to expel 415 of its leaders in January of

⁶⁶The two groups are part of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Amos, 1988, pp. 366, 369-370).

⁶⁷Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155.

1993 and to declare the organization its number one enemy.⁶⁸

As Hamas and other groups continue to subscribe to and execute the preachings of radical Islamic fundamentalism, they only increase Israel's siege mentality and therefore strengthen the vitality of Zionist ideology.

Arabs and Palestinians alike have been willing to spout warlike rhetoric--like the position expressed in 1967 when the Arab League summit in Khartoum pledged the three famous no's: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.⁶⁹ But also consider the fact that many Arab leaders view Israel's destruction as a method of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute, a situation made clear by Saddam Hussein's missiles in 1991 and by Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser on the eve of the 1967 war when he announced "[war] will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel." Making matters worse, Syria's Hafez al-Asad, just another of these doomsayers, declared in 1988 "we are looking forward to the fateful battle with the Zionist enemy."⁷⁰

⁶⁸"Hamas-the Muslim Fundamentalist Organization which Wants to Destroy the State of Israel", translated from the Hebrew newspaper, *Sha'ar l'Mathil*, ("Gate to the Beginning"), January 1993.

⁶⁹Indyk, 1991/92a.

⁷⁰Quoted in Indyk (1991/92a).

In the face of such anti-Zionist rhetoric, then, Israel should be genuinely concerned with the intentions of its neighbors; and indeed, twenty states remain in a "state of war" against the Jewish democracy,⁷¹ a posture best expressed by Iran's continuing call for the destruction of Israel. And what should be thought of the 1989 Casablanca summit of the Arab League, when support was voiced there for the Palestinian right of return as well as for the rallying of Arab forces to achieve strategic parity to contain Zionist aggression.⁷² For even if this does not overtly point toward Arab willingness to throw Israel out to the sea, it certainly raises the specter that maybe they would relish the chance to try.

There is also the matter of the Muslim holy war, or *Jihad*, that has been maintained against Israel by militant PLO factions.⁷³ Even though the December 1989 Dakar summit

⁷¹Begin, 1991, p. 26; According to the public affairs officer at the Israeli Consul General's office in San Francisco (my telephone conversation on 12 November 1992), the twenty states are comprised of the following: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

⁷²Schlesinger, 1991-92; Begin, 1991, pp. 31-32.

⁷³Recent border clashes between Israel and *Hizballah* forces in southern Lebanon led to a reiteration of the pledge to continue "the march of jihad" by the Hizballah Forces Command ("Hizballah Issues Statement on Jordan Valley Attack", 1992). During the same time period, the Islamic Resistance movement, Hamas, issued their own statement:

of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) quite notably omitted this term from its final communique; the ICO nevertheless, continues to loudly condemn "unjust Israeli aggressions" and to regard the Palestinian issue as the "biggest Islamic cause of this generation",⁷⁴ as indicated in a May 1992 press statement. So, while Islamic doctrine encourages peace, it does so only if justice is not sacrificed: "Be not wary and fainthearted, nor cry for peace when you should be uppermost; for God is with you." (Quran 47:7)

In coupling Arab rhetoric with evidence of other activities, it is, of course, no wonder that Israeli leaders naturally consider their security in jeopardy. And their concern today would seem to be amplified by the regional escalation of the arms race, which all Arab nations, save Egypt (Camp David Accords), continue to pursue.

More specifically, Syria currently represents the premier military threat to Israel after Iraq's demise in Desert Storm. And, indeed, it continues to press ahead in an unabated arms buildup in the hope of attaining strategic parity with Israel, spending \$2 billion in Saudi foreign aid after the Gulf War on various weapons such as Scud missiles

"There will be no peace with the occupiers." (" Hamas Urges 'Comprehensive Confrontation'", 1992)

⁷⁴"ICO Condemns 'Unjust Israeli Aggressions'", 1992.

from North Korea, T-72 tanks from Czechoslovakia and, possibly, M-9 missiles from China.⁷⁵

Israel's sense of insecurity is further underscored by the various Arab states that continue to be ruled by oligarchies or dictatorships, neither of which are conducive to change and both of which strengthen their base of power through force, censorship, and propaganda while using hatred as a political tool--much of it directed, in this case, against Israel.⁷⁶ Adding to the problem, the presence of Israeli-Arab citizens and almost two million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip pose internal security problems for Israel in the event of hostilities because they could become radicalized by Arab states into a fifth column.

So, although Israel's depiction of a monolithic Arab threat directly strengthens its own security arguments, Arabs and Palestinians have clearly contributed to this perception. And as has already been shown, they have accomplished this through menacing rhetoric such as "throwing Jews out to the sea;" by violence against symbol-laden targets of Israel, like children, hostages, prisoners of war, and synagogues; and by the special targeting of Jews and Israelis, as during airline hijackings and, most

⁷⁵Mau11, 1990, p. 118; Begin, 1991, pp. 31-32.

⁷⁶Begin, 1991, pp. 34-35.

memorably, the massacre of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics.⁷⁷

5. Geographic Factors

Another hindrance to a successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict derives from geographic constraints. In fact, Israel's security concerns are exacerbated by its small size and the concentration of its population into two major cities, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. And because most Israelis believe that "even one military defeat would mean the end of their country,"⁷⁸ they are united in opting to forego a "Zionism of quality" for security. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the people of Israel, whose pre-1967 borders were only nine miles apart at their narrowest point, view withdrawal as tantamount to an invitation to their own funeral.⁷⁹

Indeed, most Israelis believe their survival is at least partly based on their possession of adequate territories. Even as far back as 1917, when the Zionist leaders were planning the boundaries of the Jewish homeland, they sought to avoid the mistakes of the ancient Israelites by keeping enough land for proper military defense, by controlling water resources to provide a sound economic base, and

⁷⁷Seliktar, 1983, p. 132; Metz, 1990, p. 276.

⁷⁸Metz, 1990, p. 267.

⁷⁹Begin, 1991, pp. 26-27.

also by acquiring access to both the Red and Mediterranean Seas to establish a commercial entrepot.⁸⁰

The recent proliferation of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East has not negated the argument over borders; to the contrary, Israeli hardliners argue that the significance of the Golan, Judea and Samaria is derived, not from the extra miles those areas add to Israeli territory, but from their rugged typography which permits defensive positioning. Tactically, this would enable Israel's small standing army to hold off a massive Arab ground attack until reserve forces are in place--as ostensibly, Israel's control of the Golan Heights provided a vital defense buffer against the Syrian army during the Yom Kippur War, a situation that permitted Israel to maintain control of its northern regions.⁸¹

Israeli leaders may also fear the unknown; namely, that were they to give up the West Bank they might create a political vacuum, thereby inviting the establishment of a radical PLO or Islamic fundamental state, either of which would pose a direct security threat.⁸² As a result, the territories impart upon Israel a greater sense of self-sufficiency and protection.

⁸⁰Isaac, 1976, pp. 28-29.

⁸¹Begin, 1991, pp. 29-30; Pipes, 1991.

⁸²Begin, 1991, pp. 29-30.

Finally, in light of the siege mentality that characterizes the Jewish psyche, Jews are probably more convinced than ever that they should not trust anyone but themselves to determine their ultimate fate.⁸³ And it is precisely this attitude which, like the Berlin wall, will also have to fall if divisiveness in the Middle East is to ever be overcome.

6. Relationship with US

Another factor which has become integral to Israel's security is its relationship with the US. It has come to depend upon the US for diplomatic and military assistance, particularly during times of crisis. American statesmen were instrumental in arranging cease-fires in each of the Arab-Israeli wars and President Carter successfully brokered the Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt. American leaders have, one after the other, not only reaffirmed their support of Israel, but have made that commitment an official part of the American national security strategy. For Israel, the strong political guns of the US have enabled it to dictate, to a great extent, the terms under which it would negotiate for peace with its Arab neighbors.

American military aid has also bolstered Israel's security. The importance of US military assistance to Israel was best exemplified by the emergency airlift of

⁸³Hollis, 1991.

weapons during the dark days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the continuation of massive rearmament in the years following. The extent of Israeli reliance on American weapons systems has been such that in 1989, of the 764 combat aircraft in Israel's inventory, all but 170 were American-made.⁸⁴

The terms of US military aid have also become exceedingly generous; the US initiated direct aid grants in the mid 1970s, and from fiscal year 1985, converted almost \$2 billion in annual military aid to an all-grant form. Likewise, American economic aid is used to service Israel's foreign debt as incurred from past military purchases.⁸⁵

Certainly, Israel's leaders acknowledge the necessity for continued American support and few question America's pledge to ensure Israel's survival as a nation-state. By the same token, they have doggedly maintained their independence of action as they must also be aware that Israeli views of Israeli security and American views of Israeli security may not always coincide.

⁸⁴*The Military Balance 1992-1993*, pp. 111-112.

⁸⁵Tartter and Mason, 1990, p. 322.

III. LACK OF POLITICAL WILL

The difference between a successful person and others is not a lack of strength, not a lack of knowledge, but rather in a lack of will.

Vincent T. Lombardi

A. ISRAEL

Israel's incentives for compromise on the occupied territories have been tenuous. Indeed, a common line of thought has it that, on this issue, Israel has nothing to gain and everything to lose. For not only does Israeli society enjoy the economic benefits of holding onto the territories, but it does so with the confidence that Arab forces are not strong enough to displace it. This kind of thinking is as much a result of Israel's regional military superiority as it is due to a supportive world community that continues military and economic assistance while maintaining diplomatic and trade relations, irrespective of Israeli actions.

On the other hand, there is the fear that Israel's leaders might invite internal catastrophe by relinquishing the territories voluntarily. Although the 1992 elections have shown there is indeed a national willingness to trade

land for peace, many zealots in Israel are nevertheless adamant that territorial settlements should not be uprooted. Only time will tell if such ardor will entail serious consequences for Israel.

1. Issue of Territories

Israel has opted to tolerate the nebulous status of a de facto peace as it continues to impose a military rule upon the territories captured in 1967. What seems to be societal inertia, however, may be better considered as a reflection of an ideological stalemate prompted by two opposing, yet equally convincing political arguments. For, while Israeli political and religious hawks have argued that the territories provide greater security from Arab attack and fulfill the messianic destiny of Jews as heralded in New Zionism, counterarguments from Israeli doves have also been propounded; namely, expanded borders only increase the barriers toward true peace, and diminished security only frustrates the original aim of Zionism--the ingathering of world Jewry into a safe haven.¹

This split in Jewish public opinion has been documented in various studies. According to Sammy Smooha's survey in 1988, public opinion was almost equally divided

¹Currently, only 30 percent of the 13.5 million Jews in the world live in Israel (Smooha, 1992, p. 1).

between those who favored settlements and those who did not.² However, when asked how strongly the respondents felt about their positions, Smooha found that about 80 percent of the Jewish public were willing to compromise, one way or another, if a peace settlement could be reached. Significantly, 42 percent of these same respondents said they would not act against a government decision to withdraw from most of Judea and Samaria in return for peace, while only four percent indicated they "would act against the decision with all means, including violence." So, while public opinion on whether settlement activities should be continued is clearly divided, there seems to be a consensus that land-for-peace is a possibility.³

Israel has already experienced the trauma that a forcible uprooting of settlers can bring. The evacuation of 8,000 Jewish settlers from the Yamit district in the Sinai following the peace treaty with Egypt was such an example. The ensuing confrontations between anguished settlers and unarmed, tearful soldiers were broadcast daily across Israel's public television and radio stations;⁴ and although the eventual and successful evacuation of settlers

²Of the half who were generally opposed, 27.4 percent had reservations and 22.1 percent were against settlements (Ibid., Tab. 6.3, p. 60).

³Ibid., Tabs. 6.5, 6.6, p. 62.

⁴Lustick, 1982/83, p. 386.

could be considered as further evidence that settlements are never irreversible, it also fueled arguments to the contrary.

The difficulty of such a governmental action in the face of Gush Emunim's militancy not only provokes fear of a civil war, should a withdrawal from Samaria and Judea ever take place,⁵ but it could also lead to political disgrace for the party undertaking that unpleasant task. Thus, it is politically safer for any Israeli statesman to maintain the state of occupation than it is to end it.

A recent example highlighting the sensitivity of this issue pertains to the Golan Heights. In September 1992 an accord between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights seemed imminent and was widely reported in the media, as well as by Israeli and Jordanian government sources. According to the accounts, it would be based on a possible Israeli withdrawal and subsequent lease-back of a portion of the lands from Syria (in return for full peace and security).⁶ However, one month later, Israel's new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, reiterated his campaign

⁵Ibid.

⁶A possible Israel-Syria agreement was reported in news sources and also voiced by Mr Harry Kney-tal, Israel's consul general and by Dr. Abdel Salam Majali, head of the Jordanian peace delegation, during separate briefings to the Monterey Chapter of the World Affairs Council on 9 and 12 September 1992, respectively.

stand, saying he would yield only a portion of the Golan Heights, while, at the same time, he publicly chastised the media for indicating otherwise.⁷

Territorial benefits provided to Israeli society also help propagate governmental incentives to maintain the status quo. In an area where water resources are scarce, almost 80 percent of Israel's fresh-water needs are supplied by the West Bank, with half of it consumed by Israeli farmers and settlers in the West Bank, and the other half by the Jewish population in Israel proper. The proximity of the West Bank to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and the lure of government subsidies have also made the area an attractive bedroom community for urban commuters as well as an ideal location for high technology industries.⁸

Moreover, Israeli society so far has been willing to absorb the economic and political costs of occupation even though it is not yet profitable to do so. Governmental expenses in maintaining the territories have dipped from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1988 (\$600 million) to 0.7 percent in 1989.⁹ Palestinian unrest, inspired by the Intifada, has substantially died down and Syrian nationals in the Golan

⁷"Six Israeli Soldiers Die in Attacks", 1992.

⁸Gowers and Walker, 1989; "Stealing Arab Water", 1992; Peretz, 1986, pp. 59-78.

⁹"Economy," 1990, p. 520.

Heights are few in number and relatively untroublesome.¹⁰ Indeed, according to Benvenisti, a complete Israeli withdrawal may now be irreversible because the infrastructure and settlement of the territories have become integrated with Israel proper. Additionally, the economy of the West Bank has been more fully combined with Israel than it ever was with Jordan, both as a source of unskilled labor and as a market for finished goods.¹¹

2. International Relations

That Israel's international relations have not suffered appreciably because of its military expansionism, is another factor that further reduces the incentive to finalize negotiations. Unquestionably, the substantial aid Israel has received from the US has not only ensured its survival as a viable nation-state, but it has contributed to Jewish intransigence in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israeli peace activists, notably Mattityahu Peled, a former Israeli general and war hero, have urged the US to stop this aid. And Tikva Honig Parnas believes that cessation of American aid is "the only pressure that can

¹⁰These Syrians are comprised primarily of Druze, who are not recognized as an Islamic sect by mainstream Muslims, and so fit just as well in Israel as in Syria (Pipes, 1991).

¹¹Benvenisti cited in Harkabi (1987, pp. 43-52); Grose, 1985, p. 84.

make any impact on this society."¹² But American assistance has increased in importance for the Israeli government, not only to sustain its defenses, but to ensure its economic survival and absorption of hundreds of thousands of Soviet immigrants. In fact, President Bush's previous denial of a \$10 billion housing loan guarantee to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir while his Likud administration erected new housing settlements in the occupied territories may have helped oust Shamir in the 1992 Knesset elections.

Additionally, with the end of the Cold War and Tel Aviv's diminished strategic importance to the US, continuation of the Arab-Israeli struggle may be Israel's best bet for sustaining US support as Israel capitalizes on America's cardinal policy of ensuring Israel's right to exist. Moreover, once peace is achieved, Arab states would quickly achieve political parity with Israel in American eyes, as illustrated in the case of Egypt after signing the Camp David Accords.¹³

But in returning to the issue of American foreign assistance to Israel, it is necessary to examine the details of that monetary flow to appreciate fully the generosity of the American taxpayer. For instance, to preserve Israel's

¹²Peled cited in Bruzonsky (1991, pp. 30-31); Parnas quoted in Rosenwasser (1992, pp. 136-138).

¹³*National Security Strategy of the US* 1991, 1991, p. 10; Pranger, 1988, p. 443.

security and economic viability, the US provided \$53 billion in loans and grants from 1949-1991, most of it since the mid-1970s and under the most generous terms offered to any country. Furthermore, Israel is distinguished as the largest annual benefactor of American military and economic aid. When smaller assistance programs and unofficial sources of aid (e.g., credit, Israeli bonds, tax deductible contributions) are tallied in, the American tax burden is a costly \$10 billion per year. This does not include the \$10 billion housing assistance loan granted by President Bush, which according to Robinson, would cost the American taxpayers \$119 billion should Israel default on the loan.¹⁴

Despite the conflict, Israel's bilateral relationships with other states have continued to satisfy the country's political, as well as its economic requirements and needs. In fact, while the effects of the 1967 war have prompted many members of the international community, particularly the Soviet Union and the Third World, to sever relations with Israel as a demonstration of alignment against Israeli imperialism, many states nevertheless have maintained political and economic contacts, albeit covertly. Moreover, the Soviet Union and East European states resumed

¹⁴Pound, 1991; Grose, 1985, pp. 60-64; Tivnan, 1987, p. 227; Rubenberg, 1986, pp. 323, 333; discussion with Glenn Robinson, assistant professor, Naval Postgraduate School, 1992.

contacts with Israel in 1986, while the North African states broke the diplomatic embargo in the early 1980s.¹⁵

Also bolstering Israel's economy, the European Community--where political support of Arab states and the Palestinian cause was undoubtedly conditioned by commercial interests and dependence on Middle East oil--still represents Israel's second largest trading partner, as it accounts for about 40 percent of Israel's foreign trade.¹⁶

Israel's arms exports have also assisted in keeping political ties open to all regions of the world, and were instrumental in China's recent announcement providing full diplomatic status to the Zionist state. India's desire to assume a greater role in the Middle East, particularly in view of the current peace talks, has also prompted the initiation of diplomatic relations.¹⁷

So, while much of the international community subscribes to the tenets of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and hence does not recognize the legality of Israeli occupation, Israel nevertheless continues to receive substantial benefits from the status quo, both in terms of the strategic

¹⁵Grose, 1985, p. 107; Metz, 1990, pp. 242-243.

¹⁶Metz, 1990, pp. 170, 241; The European Economic Community receives about 38% of Israel's exports and supplies about 33% of Israel's imports (Grose, 1985, pp. 107-110).

¹⁷Gargan, 1992.

and economic importance it derives from the territories and also in regard to its relations with the US. Verily, thanks to Israel's regional military superiority and continued diplomatic and economic ties to the rest of the world, Israel has not yet been truly pressured to relinquish the territories, nor is such a prospect likely to happen soon.

3. Internal Disagreement

Because the issue of occupation is such a divisive subject in Israeli society, historically, Israel's political leadership has been averse to disrupting the status quo and has been willing to tolerate the accelerated settlement activities of the Likud administration. Until very recently, any proposal to do otherwise was tantamount to an invitation to internal opposition and strife.

In highlighting this push and pull of Israeli politics, it is noteworthy that former Prime Minister Shamir traditionally faced demands for greater flexibility though hardliners wanted less; and when Laborites proposed cabinet acceptance of Mubarak's ten-point peace initiative in October 1989, the motion was defeated on a tie vote.¹⁸ Moreover, when Likud's proposal for Palestinian autonomy during the Middle East peace talks almost led to a Knesset vote of no-confidence in the administration, the result was

¹⁸Heller, 1989/90, p. 159.

an acceleration of parliamentary elections from November to June 1992.

More than any other concern, the question of the occupied territories has split the Israeli public along ethnic, class and political lines, as well as between those people who are reluctant to relinquish any part of the territories and those who favor trading trade parts of it for peace, with only a small minority willing to give all of it back. This major dichotomy, according to several Israeli intellectuals, could well lead to a civil war if exacerbated, and the more that the US condemns settlement activity, the "harder it becomes for Israelis to draw back." For as Grose also says, the demagoguery of "standing up to the Americans" is highly appealing to a wide sector of the Israeli electorate.¹⁹

B. SYRIA

Syrian leadership represents another obstacle to an Arab-Israeli peace. Throughout most of its history, Syria has rejected the boundaries drawn by the imperial powers in the Middle East. And President Hafez al-Asad's pursuit of an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and pan-Arab policy justified his territorial claim to a Greater Syria, which altogether, comprise the basis of his anti-Western leadership.

¹⁹Peretz, 1986, pp. 76-77; Grose, 1985, pp. 115, 119.

Despite Asad's participation in the Middle East peace talks, his continuing rhetoric makes it doubly hard for him to change his policy toward compromise, for he has placed himself in a similar situation of past Arab statesmen who were in the uncomfortable position of negotiating for peace with Israel.²⁰

Asad may actually derive domestic and regional power from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Domestically, his political campaign against Israel has enabled him to maintain the ruling position of the Alawite minority because he has both been able to tap into the anti-Zionist sentiment of disenfranchised Sunnites and to avoid contention in the domestic arena. As a protagonist of anti-Zionism, he has effectively diverted attention from the Alawites past friendliness with Zionists and has also veiled the Ba'thist loss of the Golan Heights under controversial circumstances. And despite the austere economic environment of his country, Asad's foreign policy priorities have rationalized enormous defense expenditures--30 percent of GDP and 55-60 percent of total government outlays.²¹

Currently, tacit obstructionism against a real peace seems to be a logical move for Asad. For by continuing to

²⁰Pipes, 1991; Rabinovich, 1984, pp. 38-46; Rubin, 1990, p. 137; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, pp. 2-6.

²¹Pipes, 1991, pp. 36-52; Rabinovich, 1984, pp. 38-46.

participate in the Middle East peace talks he incurs American and Saudi goodwill, though he risks nothing by not making faster progress on substantive issues. As things currently stand, an Arab-Israeli stalemate serves to delay Israel's regional integration, and once peace is achieved Syria's regional influence could likely be offset by a possible Tel Aviv-Amman-Cairo axis even as Israel's leverage in Lebanon might also be increased.²² In fact, the only real losers in a protracted deadlock are the Palestinians themselves, whom Asad nevertheless claims to represent.

C. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Even though its demands have weakened through the years, the PLO has long been considered by Arab states and Palestinians alike as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian cause. Yet, as a result of internal fragmentation, poor political leadership, unfavorable consequences of terrorism, and the demoralization of its liberation movement, the PLO today has failed to present itself as a significant political challenge to Israel. Of equal consequence is Chairman Arafat's continued enjoyment of the status quo and, more particularly, the prestige he has gained while directing a multimillion-dollar organization.

²²Pipes, 1991, p. 49; Rubin, 1990, p. 137.

1. Internal Fragmentation

The PLO is fragmented internally due to a number of factors, primarily owing to the physical dispersion of Palestinians throughout the Middle East. As a result, regional cadres were formed which operated independently of each other and which tended to adopt the ideological orientation of the host country. For example, the Palestinians in Gaza flocked to either the call of Nasserism or the Muslim Brotherhood; those in Syria and Iraq adopted the Ba'thist ideology, while those in Lebanon and in other parts of the Gulf were influenced by the Arab Nationalist movement.²³ The effect of this disjointedness was that the separate cadres were easily manipulated by the various Arab leaders of host countries who sought to further their own political agendas at the expense of their rivals.

As the presence of Palestinians and their militant offshoots presented a possible threat to the host country's internal stability, Palestinians have also suffered from Arab repression.²⁴ The PLO as a whole, therefore, was never fully able to formulate a consistent doctrine, while neither was it able to implement an effective policy or engender any meaningful claim to legitimacy.

²³Amos, 1988, pp. 368-369.

²⁴Cobban, 1984, pp. 23-31.

This factionalism also made it easy for the militant *al-Fatah*, led by Arafat, to take over the PLO after the 1967 war. His leadership, however, did not immediately improve the situation, and in 1974 the regrouped PLO suffered renewed dissidence when opposition arose against Arafat's call for tactical and ideological moderation, which included his proposed acceptance of a mini-Palestinian state.²⁵ This internal split was originally compounded by Arafat's decision to incorporate ideologically diverse groups into the formal decision-making structure of the PLO, and the wedge was further deepened by his subsequent tolerance of militant guerilla factions.

According to John Amos, a three-way split finally erupted in 1980 as a result of ideological factionalism, inter-Arab connections, and generational conflict.²⁶ Naturally, the fractious and unstable nature of the PLO prompted American leaders to doubt the organization's political utility. Indeed, even if the US believed they could arrive at a political settlement, American officials

²⁵Amos, 1988, pp. 372-375; Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-479.

²⁶A centrist group which opted for rapprochement with Jordan and identified itself with the historic leadership of the PLO; a second group, which also had connections to al-Fatah leadership and demanded an independent Palestinian state; and a rejectionist group which opposed any negotiation and was backed by Syria, Libya, and Algeria. (Amos, 1988, pp. 375-376)

were skeptical of the PLO's ability to carry out its side of any agreed upon deals.²⁷

2. Political Leadership

As was hinted at in the previous section, the PLO's political position has been further weakened by its poor record of leadership. Guided by men who were consumed with the desire to liberate all of Palestine from Israel, they would consider nothing less. A proposal, advanced by a small number of Palestinian dissenters after the 1967 war, to carve a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by signing a peace treaty with Israel, was considered to be heretical. For the PLO, such a suggestion was antithetical to the prevailing concept of Palestinian nationalism. And PLO opposition was buttressed by the majority of Arab opinion. The Jordanians perceived such a plan as undermining their sovereignty and claim to the West Bank. Correspondingly, the Arab world at large viewed a separate West Bank initiative as circumventing an appropriate Arab solution to an Arab problem (i.e. the displacement of Arabs by a Zionist state) and as perpetuating Israeli control over the territories.²⁸

Israel considered its capture of the territories in the Six-Day War a unique opportunity to bargain for peace.

²⁷Cobban, 1984, pp. 245-261.

²⁸Sahliyah, 1988, pp. 26-33.

However, Arafat's stubborn adherence to the "Palestinian revolution", negated such a possibility and the collective Arab response became forever embodied as the famous "three no's" of the Khartoum Summit in 1967. Conversely, had Arafat and the Arab world responded positively to Israel's gesture, the international community might have increased pressure on Israel to implement UN Resolution 242.²⁹

The Palestinian autonomy scheme would have to wait almost twenty years before it would be seriously pursued by the PLO. It was exactly this kind of uncompromising dogma which led Israeli leaders to believe that Arafat was not really concerned with peace at all and which led them to believe that the PLO was in reality nothing more than an Arab ploy to uproot the state of Israel from the Middle East.

As such, Arafat's decisions have hurt his organization, both politically and financially, and as a result its political strength today is no match for that of Israel's. The PLO involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, for instance, and the subsequent Israeli retaliation against Palestinian refugee camps led to a bitter internal schism between moderate and maximalist factions of the PLO; it also

²⁹Ralph Magnus, associate chairman and associate professor, Department of National Security Affairs, lectures on NS3361, "Problems of Government and Security in Israel", Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Spring 1992.

contributed to the loss of Arafat's credibility among European supporters.³⁰

But his latest egregious mistake came in 1990 when his endorsement of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait undermined the activities of the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; this same support also cost the PLO at least \$85 million in yearly Saudi contributions and another \$40 million from Palestinian workers in the Persian Gulf who, as a result of losing their pre-war jobs, are now searching for work.³¹

More recently, even Arafat's plane crash points to his apparent lack of foresight as it was precisely this April 1992 event that led Palestinian leaders to levy new criticisms toward him regarding his failure to prepare for such a crisis by not having pre-selected an acceptable, alternative leader. In a similar vein, they have also reproached him for not yet developing an alternative plan of action in the event the Middle East peace talks should fail.³²

In the aftermath of such mistakes by Arafat, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, and Syria no longer seem to

³⁰Mansfield, 1990, p. 477; Grose, 1985, pp. 108-109; Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 287.

³¹Indyk, 1991/92b, pp. 81-83; Walker and Andoni, 1990.

³²Hijazi, 1992.

regard the PLO as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In fact, following the Saudi lead, they have severed monetary support as well.³³

3. Terrorist Tactics

As was mentioned earlier, Arafat's incorporation of the various militant guerilla factions into the PLO has significantly contributed to that organization's weakened political position. For not only did this inclusion impede any unity of thought or purpose within the PLO, but it also never allowed Arafat to limit the terrorist activities of these groups, a situation that backfired against the PLO. For with thousands of armed Palestinian fighters inhabiting various Arab states, it was soon perceived these freedom fighters were a threat to Arab stability. As a consequence of such fears, they were expelled from Jordan in 1970 as, otherwise, they have been closely watched and controlled by their host states. At the same time, the PLO's so-called military successes against Israel have been few and, in any case, not very effective in furthering the Palestinian cause.³⁴

The use of terrorism has also undermined international and Israeli sympathy for the Palestinians, as their violent tactics have tended to overshadow their cause. In

³³Indyk, 1991.

³⁴Drysdale and Blake, 1985, p. 286.

recognizing this, Palestinian delegates are of late hard at work trying to achieve a peaceful resolution of their situation even though they face internal opposition to their efforts, particularly from the militant factions.³⁵ But it should be pointed out that the ability of these delegates to carry on their negotiations is made even more uncertain by Israel's settlement and deportation activities, which continue to this day.

Despite their apparent setbacks in the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, mainstream PLO rejectionists still seem to advocate a continuation of the conflict until some time in the future when they believe the preponderance of Arabs will inevitably shift the balance of power to their advantage.³⁶

4. Demoralization

In the meantime, political failures, internecine conflicts, and the successfulness of Israel's suppressive measures have taken their toll on the Palestinian national movement. For as Wendy Kristianasen says³⁷:

³⁵Most opposed to the peace process are the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas movement, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Gauch, 1991).

³⁶..mos, 1988, pp. 372-375; Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-479.

³⁷Kristianasen, 1991.

The intifada continues in an institutionalized form, but it has lost its heart. Anger and demonstrations still erupt in response to events, but it is only the gangs of masked youths who still go about their business without any real enthusiasm.

Even the international media has lost its romance with the Palestinian independence movement, casting doubt on the continuing political utility of the PLO. The reluctance of Arab leaders to honor their financial pledges to the PLO may have increased intraorganizational violence; personal actions to extort money or settle private scores were conducted under the pretext of national resistance; and Israeli collaborators or those who publicly encouraged moderation were punished or assassinated.³⁸ As a matter of record, about 500 Palestinians have died at the hands of other Palestinians since the Intifada began in 1987.³⁹

Perhaps the most demoralizing failure for the PLO, though, has been its inability to achieve Palestinian independence despite an historic concession at the end of 1988 which, first, affirmed the principle of partitioning, second, renounced terrorism, and finally, accepted Israel's

³⁸Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-477; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155.

³⁹"Arabs in Occupied Lands Hoping to Halt the Killing of Informers", 1992; The intifada began spontaneously in December 1987 as an effort to resist Israeli occupation (Rosenwasser, 1992, p. 15).

right to exist.⁴⁰ Their lack of success was blamed on US and Israeli actions--the former for not endorsing Palestinian statehood and refusing to discuss the substance of a final-status agreement, and the latter for its opposition to Palestinian statehood and its rejection of any direct dealings with the PLO. And despite Arafat's historic 1988 compromise, Israeli leaders have remained skeptical of Arafat's intentions, pointing to his 1974 speech where he spoke only of the broader aim of replacing Israel with a democratic, secular state.⁴¹

5. Multimillion-Dollar Organization

Meanwhile, Arafat's lack of political progress seems not to have seriously undermined his personal power, international prestige, or popular support. Lebanese Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, says that Arafat and his PLO companions are the "richest revolutionaries in history."⁴² Indeed, Yasir Arafat, as chairman of the PLO, as spokesman for al-Fatah (the PLO's main component), and as commander-in-chief of the "forces of the Palestinian revolution,"⁴³ manages a \$275 million operation and has control of al-Fatah

⁴⁰Kristianasen. 1991; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155; Mansfield, 1990, pp. 469-479.

⁴¹Kristianasen, 1991, pp. 9-10; Heller, 1989/90, pp. 154-155; Mansfield, 1990, p. 477.

⁴²Mansfield, 1990, p. 477.

⁴³Hijazi, 1992.

investments worth more than \$2 billion. In addition, the PLO has a 14,000 man army and has diplomatic offices in more countries than Israel.⁴⁴ That Arafat has cultivated a personal, rather than an institutional, basis of leadership was evidenced by the crisis of succession that emerged during his brief disappearance in April.⁴⁵

In sum, Arafat has contributed to the failure of the PLO to represent an effective movement for peace, having increased the already fractious nature of the PLO through the incorporation of additional militant factions, through his toleration of the use of international terrorism, and through his failure to capitalize upon opportunities to advance Palestinian interests. And his dubious status as one of the richest revolutionaries in history may further undermine his will to achieve an expeditious political resolution of the conflict when weighed against his own future prospects once independence is achieved.

D. UNITED STATES

While the Arabs and Israelis have ultimate responsibility in resolving their conflict, both sides in general have looked to the US for assistance in brokering a resolution.

⁴⁴The PLO has offices in some 90 countries (Walker and Andoni, 1990).

⁴⁵Arafat was missing for 15 hours after his plane crashed in the Libyan Desert (Hijazi, 1992).

As the only remaining superpower after the Cold War, and as the only player with a strong relationship with both Arabs and Israelis, the US could be the key in unlocking the door to peace. By the same token, it appears the US will continue to rely on the Arab-Israeli negotiating process as the primary, if not the sole, method of resolving their mutual grievances.

Why has America refrained from taking any other measures, remaining content with the lack of progress in the status quo? Simply put, America may lack the desire to take any extraordinary action: national security has been maintained despite the conflict; domestic issues have increased in importance versus those on the international scene; and, administrative policy on the Middle East has been reactionary at best.

1. National Security

American national security, both in regards to strategic interests in the Middle East and domestic requirements, continues to be satisfied, and as such, may impede any initiative outside the current peace process. Underscoring this comfort with the status quo, the alliances that America has enjoyed with both Arabs and with Israel have provided strategic benefits to the US, particularly during the Cold War. These associations were instrumental in containing Soviet aggression and maintaining friendly

control of strategic resources--the most important of which has been oil. At the same time, US bilateral relationships with Muslim states were minimally affected by American support of Israel, and American access to oil was disrupted only briefly--and with mixed success--during the embargoes of 1967 and 1973.⁴⁶ Moreover, the increasing economic interdependence between the West and the oil-sheikdoms has enhanced the free flow of oil at moderate prices.

The spectacular rise in the price of oil during the 1970s, though still comparatively low, shifted regional influence from the anti-Western states of Egypt and Syria, to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing states. Consequently, this shift assisted American interests in promoting moderation and stability in the Middle East.

That US-Muslim alliances have been minimally affected by the US-Israeli relationship is evidenced in close American ties with Iran before the Islamic revolution, with Arab states in the lower Persian Gulf, post-Nasser Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq during the mid-1980s. Even American relations with the so-called radical states of Syria and Iran have improved in recent years with the dissolution of their communist benefactor, the Soviet Union.

⁴⁶McFadden, 1987, p. 8; Jacobs, 1991.

2. Competing Issues and Problems

Domestically, the US has had to contend with the interests of its own military-industrial establishment and the requirements of national security in keeping open large-scale weapon production lines. This may have detracted from the political will that would have been necessary to effect a swift and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace accord. Arms sales to foreign consumers, for example, particularly countries in the Middle East, have brought in substantial revenues to the US economy. In fact, the US supplied 18 percent of the region's total arms imports from 1984-1988 with a gross value of \$16.3 billion, with cash sales to oil sheikdoms (for example, Saudi Arabia bought \$5.8 billion in the same period).⁴⁷ In addition, these purchases helped to recycle petrodollars back to the US.

With the end of the Cold War, the drawdown of the US military has heralded a decrease in domestic arms consumption. Consequently, foreign sales have acquired increasing importance, not just as a source of revenue, but also to ensure necessary production lines remain operational for the future needs of the American military. As Charles Duelfer says, "Individual companies and government agencies are looking at exports with new vigor, if not desperation, to sustain defense production capabilities." And recently, a

⁴⁷*World Military Expenditures*, 1990, pp. 9, 13.

"State Department cable was sent to all diplomatic posts expounding upon . . . and advising them to support the marketing efforts of US defense firms abroad."⁴⁸

Additionally, American military leaders are concerned with the continuing spate of force reductions, wherein reduction figures of 25 percent have ballooned to possible cuts of up to 50 percent. Certainly, such military concerns reflect upon institutional interests as much as they might also reflect upon genuine national security dictates.

As a large-scale European ground war has now been essentially ruled out, a new national military strategy has established major regional crises as the basis for threat planning, and the "most uncertain region for the immediate and perhaps long-term future is the Persian Gulf and Middle East." More specifically, "dealing with Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors will continue to pose a significant challenge and will be an important ingredient to future US national security planning."⁴⁹ Thus, as the US plays the Arab-Israeli peace broker, the parochial interests of the defense establishment and the legitimate concerns regarding production-line capabilities might negate the full devotion

⁴⁸Duelfer, 1990, p. 13; "New State Directive", 1990.

⁴⁹Ullman, 1991, pp. 83-84, 180.

of American efforts toward resolving the current Arab-Israeli stalemate.

Of course, competing concerns have diverted American attention from the Middle East in the more distant past as well. A case in point occurred after 1967 when American leaders were involved in the difficult execution of the Vietnam War and in controlling massive anti-war demonstrations across the nation. While President Eisenhower was able to take an active involvement after the 1956 Sinai Raid to ensure an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, US preoccupation with Southeast Asia precluded a similar effort after successive Arab territories fell to Israeli forces in 1967. What made this latter situation even more unworkable was that the US was also concurrently involved in the Cold War and was unlikely to seek coordinated UN action between the two superpowers, as would have possibly occurred had international relations been warmer.⁵⁰

Still, there are other issues which pull attention away from the Arab-Israeli situation. The first of these is the concern of American statesmen in trying to rebuild the fledgling Russian economy even as they seek to safeguard the nuclear resources and technology of a former enemy. Secondly, it is doubtful the US will initiate any action to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict outside the framework of

⁵⁰Wright, 1975, p. 29.

the current Mideast peace talks. In fact, even the involvement of Secretary of State Warren Christopher in the Arab-Israeli peace process gave way to American interests in other areas of the world.

It is also unlikely the US will offer foreign aid as an inducement to sign a peace accord, as it was able to do with Israel and Egypt a decade earlier. President Clinton will be constrained from offering such enticements, for America itself suffers from an ailing economy, a \$4 trillion deficit and a multitude of costly, domestic problems. President Clinton's former presidential campaign rival, Texas businessman, Ross Perot, continues to lambast Clinton's poor performance in remedying the deficit, and Perot's periodic press statements only help revive memories of his statistic-laden graphs and flip charts which first forced public attention upon this issue.

In addition to Perot's clarion call for fiscal responsibility, the Clinton administration has to tackle a slew of costly, domestic problems. During the presidential campaign, Clinton pledged to address the restoration of urban America, which was given new urgency following a burst of spontaneous riots in Los Angeles and other major cities after the Rodney King verdict in May 1992. He also promised to rectify rising medical costs by instituting national health care. In addition, the conversion of military

industries to civilian uses, the reform of the political system, the continued costs of the savings and loan clean-up, and the default of government-insured mortgages worth billions of dollars all require time and money.

In short, any one of the above contemporary issues is, by itself, important enough to most Americans that it will remain focused in many minds for some time to come; each of these issues demand the president's attention and further decrease the priority of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the national agenda.

But Clinton has not neglected the issue entirely and he has used careful appointments to put new vigor into the peace process. His selection of Dennis Ross, a close aide to President Bush, as the administration's special coordinator for Middle East peace talks, and of Assistant Secretary of State Edward P. Djerejian as US ambassador to Israel, signal his intention to place high priority on a break-through in the talks. According to Oded Aran, Deputy Director, Department of Foreign Affairs in Israel, Economic Matters, Israel views both men as objective and highly experienced in Middle East matters, and it regards Clinton's choices as indeed indicative of his earnestness to accelerate progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations.⁵¹ The

⁵¹Oded Aran, interview on the Israeli news program, *Schmonae b'Erev*, (Eight O'Clock in the Evening), SCOLA, 20 June 1993.

administration has also taken a much more active role than its predecessor, offering bridging proposals, such as an offer to help guarantee Israel's security if it returns the Golan Heights to Syria.⁵² Similarly, Clinton's staff has been "alternately cajoling and chastizing the participants"⁵³ in order to rouse them from their inertia.

Despite all that, the administration has refrained from taking measures outside the framework of direct negotiations. After all, this is the path of least resistance and least effort: it satisfies Israel's dictates; it is agreeable to the Arabs; and it requires as little or as much effort as the US is willing to invest. Again, due to competing American concerns, it is incumbent upon the Arabs and the Israelis themselves to bridge the road to peace. As Martin Indyk, the new head of Middle Eastern affairs in the National Security Council, suggests, such competing interests further narrow the window of opportunity for American involvement.⁵⁴

3. Lack of US Peace Plan

In its own lack of a clear vision for peace, America it seems has always preferred to rely on Israeli and Arab

⁵²News broadcast from National Public Radio, 15 June 1993.

⁵³Sinai, 1993.

⁵⁴Indyk, 1991/92b.

proposals, which as of yet have come to naught. To begin, the Middle East was placed low on the US list of priorities at the start of the former Bush administration, which exhibited a marked "preference for the status quo." And the earlier efforts by Secretary of State James Baker in commencing the peace talks and push-starting any stalls were really in repayment for, and were only possible because of, earlier Arab support for the US-led coalition during Desert Storm.⁵⁵

Furthermore, Bush's removal of James Baker from his position as secretary of state to manage the presidential re-election campaign at a crucial juncture in the peace talks indicated quite clearly the low priority that was assigned by the administration to US mediation efforts. More recently, President Clinton has stated and demonstrated his intention to seek continuity on Bush's foreign policy endeavors.

American foreign policy in the region has been further hampered by a trilateral, American-Israeli-Arab, approach to Middle East relations. Such an endeavor makes for a policy that is passive, ambiguous and reactive, because the interests of each corner of the triangle inevitably become confused with those of the others. This

⁵⁵Heller, 1989/90, p. 154; Quote by Indyk, 1991/92b, pp. 70-71, 83.

arrangement is also potentially inadequate for the protection of vital American interests.⁵⁶

Where former President Bush may have attempted to influence the Arab-Israeli peace process, though, might have been through sheer political gamesmanship, a strategy that may have played a key role in allowing Labor to emerge victorious over Likud in the June parliamentary elections. For although Likud touted itself as being the only party to have made peace with an Arab state,⁵⁷ the Labor Alignment, which steadfastly has been willing to trade land for peace, claimed it alone was able to propose a formula that would be acceptable to both Jews and Palestinians.⁵⁸ Bush, for one, apparently took to heart such assertions.

In any case, Labor managed to garner the support of the Republican administration.⁵⁹ Indeed, President Bush's decision to withhold a \$10 billion housing assistance loan until Yitzhak Shamir agreed to stop new construction was seen as a catalyst for Labor's electoral victory. America's carrot-stick approach may have made the economic costs of

⁵⁶Pranger, 1988, p. 444.

⁵⁷"Likud, Labor, Meretz Launch Election Ads 24 May", 1992.

⁵⁸Discussion with Dr. Ralph Magnus, associate chairman and associate professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 8 June 1992.

⁵⁹Haberman, 1992.

Likud's unwavering settlement policy more dissatisfying to the Israeli public (particularly to the hundreds of thousands of immigrant Soviet Jewish voters) when weighed against the programs that would suffer because government spending would be directed elsewhere. Just as unpalatable was the prospect of higher long-term unemployment rates if the absorptive capacity of the country could not accommodate the tremendous influx of new citizens.

Generally, American peace efforts have often come only in the wake of a major crisis, even though since 1967 every American administration has at least partly sought to broker a successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, albeit if in vain. Given its poor track record, there are limits to US staying power, particularly with a problem it did not create. Consider, for example, Aaron Auerbach's conclusion regarding the Middle East conflict⁶⁰:

This problem doesn't have a solution. Maybe you can control it, contain it, keep it from blowing up. But solve it? Never.

⁶⁰Pranger, 1988, pp. 434, 447; Auerbach, quoted in Shipler (1987, p. 77), is a psychologist who emigrated to Israel in the 1970s.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

Political structures shape political processes.

Kenneth Waltz

Even as many key figures or groups of people lack the necessary political will to resolve the Middle East conflict--because, as it has been shown, it is not in their personal interests to do so--there also exist certain kinds of organizational constraints which by their very nature also inhibit a solution. Indeed, while people with different ideologies, goals, and agendas may come and go, one thing that always remains constant is that they must work within the boundaries of the institution in which they find themselves. This section will now examine such organizational constraints as they pertain to the Middle East problem¹.

A. ISRAEL'S POLITICAL/MILITARY SYSTEM

The nature of Israel's political system minimizes outside inputs to foreign policy as might come from the public, academia, media and special interest groups.

¹Organizational constraints faced by the United Nations are examined in Section V.

Likewise, government policies in the area of foreign affairs reflect the priorities of the political elite in maintaining its power base, its institutional stability, as well as the status quo. Consequently, the interests of the political and military elite in continuing the status quo--and especially, the path of least domestic resistance--have traditionally negated any serious governmental attempt to respond to the peace movement, as exemplified in the failed Labor peace proposal to the Knesset after the 1967 war.

1. Party Politics

Israel's political system has evolved from one that has embraced ideological and organizational creativity, to one that today is increasingly dominated by party politics. The preeminence of large political parties, which are themselves controlled by political careerists who are labelled by Samuel Huntington as *apparatchiks*, has produced a stable government, but, according to Asher Arian, a professor of political science at Tel Aviv University, their rise has also imposed a pattern of conformity, timidity, and loss of enterprise.²

The oligarchical nature of the political structure, from the choosing of Knesset candidates for a party list to the maintenance of party discipline during Knesset proceedings, have entrenched the political power of the parties,

²Brzezinski and Huntington, 1985; Arian, 1985, p. 59.

especially the two largest and most influential--Labor and Likud.³

The system is now designed to perpetuate the influence of the large parties, not only through the Labor controlled *Histadrut*, which is the country's largest civilian employer, labor representative and provider of health services,⁴ but also through favorable Knesset legislation regarding the financing of election campaigns and the allocation of parliamentary seats.⁵

Adding to the political uniformity in Israel, both Labor and Likud actually present similar views with regard to the occupied territories and the Palestinian question.

³In February 1992, the Labor party deviated from traditional backroom procedures by letting 150,000 of its registered members formulate the party list.

⁴The *Histadrut* wields considerable economic, social and political power for the Labor party, which has controlled the *Histadrut* since its inception in 1920 as a federation of trade unions. The *Histadrut* represents the interests of 80 percent of Israel's work force. Health services provided through the *Histadrut's* *Kupat Holim* sick fund cares for 75 percent of Israel's citizens. Health services provided to members of the religious parties helped promote long-term political cooperation between Labor and those parties. (Arian, 1985, pp. 8, 50, 204-210)

⁵Legislation passed in 1969 mandated election campaign payments to the parties based on their proportional representation in the Knesset, with more monies allocated to parties with greater representation. The *d'Hondt* system is used to recalculate surplus votes after the initial allocation of Knesset seats has been made. This system, introduced through the Bader-Ofer Amendment (1973) uses a formula which favors the larger parties to the detriment of the smaller ones. (Ibid., pp. 106, 123)

For example, neither party advocates withdrawal to the 1949 borders or the establishment of a Palestinian state in presently occupied territories; and neither favors a total ban on new settlements.

Big party politics aside, there are some ideologically extreme viewpoints being offered by a few smaller, less powerful political parties. Although this has helped to minimize the impact from right-wing hardliners, it has also diminished the political influence of the peaceniks. One of these smaller parties, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), emerged in 1977 and captured 15 Knesset seats in its attempt to curb Likud's aggressive settlement policies in the occupied territories, especially during the Camp David negotiations. However, its role was marginal and the DMC eventually disbanded at the close of its four-year term in office.⁶

Another organizational constraint that impedes the implementation of individual peace initiatives may come from the parliamentary system itself, which depends upon coalition forces to function, or in other words, large, compromise-oriented bodies that expect personal adherence to party discipline.⁷ The problem with this kind of organization was perhaps best illustrated by the necessity to form a

⁶Ibid., pp. 90-93.

⁷Isaac, 1976, pp. 9-10; Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.

National Unity Government (NUG) from 1984-1988 when neither Labor or Likud could establish a ruling coalition with the smaller parties. The final arrangement resulted in the temporary suspension of any substantial action on the Arab-Israeli peace progress as both parties, lacking any consensus for change, were forced to support only the status quo during the NUG administration.

2. Lack of Outside Inputs

While the structure of Israel's political system has favored the predominance of the large political parties and their leaders, it may have concomitantly constrained the opportunity for inputs into government foreign policy decisions from the media, the general public, and academic institutions. According to Aaron Klieman, a professor of international relations at Tel Aviv University, prevailing security concerns and reliance on politicians for information or support may have minimized such inputs.⁸ The nation's cumulative experience with wars and crises have made these groups more willing to give the government a free hand in national security strategies and foreign policies.

Even though the media has formed an important link between the government and the public since the *Yishuv* (pre-state Israel), its role in foreign policy has been limited due to state censorship on all news items. The willingness

⁸Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.

of the press to accept such censorship derives from the importance of national security. Indeed, it is widely known that the government exercises direct control over many of the radio and television stations, and that some of the daily newspapers are affiliated with political parties.⁹ Ultimately, the media routinely depends upon government officials for much of its news details and is therefore unwilling to jeopardize continued access to such information--the lifeblood of its existence.

The general public has also played a minimal role in directing foreign affairs, for not until the 1992 parliamentary election did the public send a clear mandate to the government for peace. Many reasons have been offered by Israeli analysts for the negligible public role. One perception is that Israelis are not inclined toward political activism on anything but bread-and-butter issues and that, where partisan foreign policy interest groups do develop, they tend to either disband after a government decision is made or to reorganize into a political party.¹⁰

For example, *Ha Moetza l'Shalom u'Bitachon*, the Council on Peace and Security, was formed in 1988 to encourage territorial compromise and provide viable solutions for Israel's security needs on the West Bank other

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

than through direct physical control over the land and the people. It was challenged within a few months by a rival hardline group, and both groups subsequently dropped from public sight shortly after the 1988 elections; Klieman regards this phenomena as characteristic of political movements in general in Israel.¹¹

Even the Peace Now movement has been criticized, by Peled, as being essentially ineffective, limited to a few demonstrations each year, and without any real desire to "shake the system."¹²

A direct voter-candidate relationship and greater access to political leaders have also been minimized in Israel's political system because people vote for party lists rather than for individuals.¹³

There have also been minimal foreign policy inputs from academia and think tanks. Yehoshafat Harkabi, a professor of international relations at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and Aaron Klieman have criticized their compatri-

¹¹Ibid., p. 118.

¹²Bruzonsky, 1991, pp. 30-33.

¹³Klieman, 1990, pp. 109-119; Some changes in Israel's electoral system have been noted. In 1992, the Labor party conducted the first-ever primary style election by allowing its constituents to formulate the party list. As a result, Rabin and Peres were elected to the number one and two spots, respectively (Salpeter, 1992). Additionally, election rules have recently been changed to permit direct elections for prime minister, beginning in 1995.

ots for not taking a "lead in molding public and official thinking."¹⁴

Harkabi expressed his disappointment with Israeli intellectuals who share his belief that a settlement with the Arabs is imperative but who also refuse to support him in public or to disseminate his writings through the educational system. Klieman, meanwhile, suggests that the reluctance on the part of intellectuals to get involved on an institutional basis may not only stem from disparate viewpoints and the inherent difficulties in proposing a viable policy alternative, but that it may also reflect a reluctance to enter what may be perceived as "dirty politics" as well as an aversion toward opposing the national swing to the right since Likud's rise to power in 1977.¹⁵

Additionally, institutions comparable to the Council on Foreign Relations in the US or the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Britain have only recently been established in Israel. Verily, until recently, a review of Israel's international relations and foreign policy

¹⁴Klieman (1990, p. 115) with similar sentiments by Harkabi (1987, pp. 45-46).

¹⁵Harkabi, 1987, pp. 45-46; Klieman, 1990, pp. 115-118.

decisions were limited to the usual political party forums.¹⁶

3. Israeli Military

Israel's demonstrated conventional military superiority, and the widely accepted fact that Israel is the only regional member of the nuclear club, is another organizational constraint that enables Israel to maintain the status quo. Although Israel has never publicly acknowledged its possession of nuclear weapons, Israel is purported to have developed low-yield nuclear warheads, expanding its nuclear options from strategic warfare, to tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use.¹⁷

But would Israel actually use these weapons? Regarding this question, Seymour Hersh reports that during the Yom Kippur War, Israel targeted its nuclear missile launchers against military headquarters locations in Cairo and Damascus, and also states that Israel was fully prepared to implement the "Samson Option" if battlefield events (an imminent Arab victory) required Israel to do so. He also suggests that in 1973 the US conceded to an immediate and massive resupply of Israel's conventional armaments in order to avert a Middle East nuclear war.¹⁸

¹⁶Klieman, 1990, pp. 107-130.

¹⁷Hersh, 1991, p. 216.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 225-227.

Nuclear weapons aside, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are considered able to defeat any likely combination of Arab conventional opponents well into the near future.¹⁹ This is partly a result of the IDF having received, and maintained, a favorable balance of arms since the beginning of the Tripartite rationing system in the early 1950s²⁰ as well as its having developed a professional and combat-ready military. The fact that Israel also has in place an effective indications and warning system only adds to its combat readiness.

Conversely, the Arabs have lost every major military conflict they have fought, and the strength of their military coalition was further diminished when, first, Egypt negotiated an Israeli peace treaty in 1978 and, secondly, when Iraq was routed in last year's Gulf War. In addition, history has shown that Syria alone, Israel's arch-enemy, cannot win on the battlefield with Israel, a fact graphically highlighted during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon.²¹

¹⁹Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 307-308.

²⁰The Tripartite Declaration consisted of Britain, France and America and lasted from 1950-1955. Its administration provided Israel with the quantitative and qualitative resources to "defeat any likely combination of Arab opponents." (Jabber, 1981, p. 118)

²¹For example, on 9 June, 70 Syrian and 100 Israeli jets engaged in the largest air battle of contemporary warfare. During that dogfight, 29 Syrian MIGs were shot

In light of all this, Israel, with its military superiority still firmly intact, may now be more inclined to insist on permanent retention of the West Bank while, concurrently, Israel's ability to indigenously produce a large array of weaponry reduces susceptibility to American pressure to give up the contested territories.²²

Even though the issue of the occupied territories is unresolved internationally, Israel's military has enabled Israeli society to enjoy a de facto peace with Arab neighbors. And Israeli reprisals against neighboring states, for tolerating or promoting border raids into Israeli territory, have been instrumental in both reducing Arab incursions and promoting tacit acceptance of Israel's post-1967 boundaries.

Meanwhile, Jordan and Syria have sought to avoid border confrontations with Israel by suppressing PLO militants, by respecting Israel's "red line" areas in Lebanon, and by engaging in secret political meetings to discuss mutual border concerns. Indeed, while a Saudi-backed newspaper in 1985 called upon Muslims to "exterminate Israel once and for all," Saudi Arabia was unwilling to

down without the loss of a single Israeli plane. The following day, Syria lost another 35 planes in a second massive air battle. (Seale, 1988, pp. 376-394)

²²Brzezinski, 1991; Sanders, 1990/91.

martyr itself as long as its oil fields were in reach of Israeli retribution.²³

Arab organizational structures are also less than effective against Israel; consider how the Arab League was substantially weakened after suspending Egyptian membership in 1979 and how the Gulf Cooperation Council, without a military policy or force, has been impotent in the face of Israeli martial actions.²⁴

One other way in which Israel's military contributes to the status quo derives from the domestic role of the defense industrial establishment. For as the most powerful special interest group in Israel,²⁵ its efforts are directed toward protecting the economic, military, and political benefits it enjoys and which it does not want to give up. Indeed, the vital role that defense plays in the continued survival of Israeli society has enhanced both its political power as well as its ability to capture a large share of the national budget. There is little question that, if Israel ever comes to peaceful terms with its Arab neighbors, the military budget would probably be reduced and

²³Mau11, 1990, p. 120; Tartter, 1991, pp. 37, 224; Rubin, 1990, pp. 137-138.

²⁴Fisher and Ochsenwald, 1990, pp. 738-739.

²⁵Klieman, 1990, p. 114.

equipment holdings curtailed²⁶--an unattractive prospect, to say the least, to those in the defense establishment.

B. PLO DISUNITY

While the political system within Israel has narrowed the source of foreign policy inputs, thereby strengthening an Israeli hardline approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, events such as the Palestinian Diaspora have worked against the unity of the PLO as a representative organization. As a result, the PLO lacks the kind of strong vertical political links that exist in most conventional pyramid-structured organizations. This weakness is compounded by Arab and Israeli attempts to infiltrate, split, or undermine the al-Fatah.²⁷ Additionally, the incorporation of tactically and ideologically diverse, and sometimes opposing, factions under the umbrella of the PLO have further limited the effectiveness of Palestinian negotiators in the current peace negotiations.

But even as the possibility for peace with Israel draws nearer, Palestinian unity nevertheless suffers. Indeed, it is this very fragmentation and lack of coherence that impedes the current peace process. Harry Kney-tal, consul general of Israel, recently remarked that the Palestinian

²⁶Duncan, 1984, p. 115.

²⁷Amos, 1988, pp. 23-31.

delegates have no clear chain of command and that each speaks for a different faction even as the composition of the delegates continually changes and has a high turnover rate--a situation that makes negotiations difficult at best.²⁸

C. AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Although analysts differ on the reasons underlying the special US-Israel relationship--be they ideological, religious, cultural, moral, and/or strategic--all seem to agree that the American electoral and legislative processes have enabled the Jewish community to shape American foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1. Jewish Lobby and PAC Power

Primarily because of its close working relationship with Congress, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has long been successful in its lobbying efforts on behalf of Israel. Currently, AIPAC has a staff of 100, a budget of \$12 million, members from more than 55,000 households, and its own political action committee (PAC) that was established in 1976,²⁹ though, since then, 124 additional pro-Israel PACs (allegedly controlled by AIPAC) have emerged

²⁸Address by Harry Kney-tal, Israeli Consul General to the US, (based in San Francisco), to the Monterey Chapter of the World Affairs Council, 9 September 1992, Monterey, CA.

²⁹Grove, 1991; Curtiss, 1990, p. 15.

onto the American political scene. To illustrate AIPAC's influence with American policy makers, in the 1988 general elections the above mentioned pro-Israel PACs spent a combined \$5.4 million as compared to \$3 million as expended by the National Association of Realtors. The next four largest PACs each spent only \$2 million.³⁰

AIPAC's primary strength is its special relationship with Congress, which it has fostered in several ways. First of all, each of its lobbyists are former congressional aides who enjoy unique associations with current members of Congress and their staff. Secondly, AIPAC "attends every hearing, every session, every mark-up" affecting Israel. Moreover, AIPAC functions as a daily "information resource for virtually every federal office candidate [by providing] a dependable source of information about the Middle East."³¹

AIPAC's considerable power is no doubt due to the enormous outlay of campaign monies that are typically made available to House and Senate candidates during critical elections. And if it were not for the fact that presidential elections are financed almost entirely with public

³⁰The next four largest PACs after AIPAC are the Teamsters Union, the American Medical Association, the National Education Association, and the National Association of Federal Employees (Curtiss, 1990, p. v).

³¹Novik, 1983; "What is AIPAC?", 1992.

funds, AIPAC money would undoubtedly influence these all-important races as well. Nevertheless, according to *The World Almanac of US Politics*, "candidates have become so dependent on PAC money that they actually visit PAC offices and all but demand contributions."³²

But AIPAC does not merely limit itself to influencing election campaigns. For instance, in order to build local, non-Jewish support, AIPAC places great emphasis on establishing grassroots organizations in places where there are no large Jewish communities. And its nationwide political network and key contacts with senators and congressmen play an essential role in complementing the work of the Washington staff. Furthermore, AIPAC uses the media to "educate the American public on the need for a strong US-Israel relationship," and it also has student liaisons on over 175 college campuses to combat anti-Israeli propaganda³³--a practice Tivnan describes as crushing to academic freedom and debate. Indeed, AIPAC routinely coaches students on the correct way of handling "anyone who might disagree with the AIPAC line," and through its Political Leadership Development Program, AIPAC trains

³²Wagman, 1991, p. 30.

³³"What is AIPAC?", 1992.

students "in the fine art of increasing pro-Israel attitudes on campus."³⁴

2. Unique Lobby/PAC Practices

The practices of the pro-Israel lobby and its subordinate PACs are different from other PACs in several ways. First, AIPAC has been able to circumvent federal laws which limit PAC contributions to \$5,000 per candidate per election (i.e., \$5,000 for the primary, and \$5,000 for the general election each year).³⁵ And with over a hundred like-minded PACs under AIPAC direction³⁶, it has thus been able to contribute 10-20 times over the limit prescribed by law. The result is that AIPAC is able to exert considerable political influence through congressional campaign contributions.³⁷

³⁴Tivnan, 1987, pp. 184-185.

³⁵Curtiss, 1990, pp. v-vii.

³⁶AIPAC does not acknowledge that it has any control or direction over the pro-Israel PACs, although there is an overlap of staff between AIPAC and pro-Israel PACs. Curtiss, 1990, p. xiii. AIPAC's relationship with pro-Israel PACs was publicized in October 1988 when two internal AIPAC memos involving political campaign activities were aired on the CBS television program "60 Minutes" and other news shows. Grove, 1991.

³⁷Andrew Kilgore and six other former US government officials submitted a complaint to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) against AIPAC and 27 pro-Israel PACs in January 1988 for violating Federal campaign spending limitations by orchestrating its donations. In December 1990, the FEC ruled that there was 'insufficient evidence' to support the charge (Grove, 1991). When I asked former Representative Paul McClosky, Jr., about this ruling, he

The pro-Israel PACs are also dissimilar from other PACs because they are virtually unopposed, whereas most corporate and professional PACs are countered by consumer and public interest groups. In fact, AIPAC outspent "the combined forces of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans 145 to 1 in the 1988 elections."³⁸ And unlike other PACs, which identify their sponsors or purpose in their title, 118 of the 124 pro-Israel PACs prefer to keep a low profile by failing to mention the Middle East, Israel, Judaism or Zionism in their official titles.

3. AIPAC's Power Base

AIPAC success is derived from several sources. First, Israel's security has been, and remains, a vital interest for the US. As a result, many of AIPAC's objectives have been congruent with the perceptions of US elites. While it is beyond the scope of this work to determine whether these perceptions are a result of AIPAC's exhaustive work in consolidating the US-Israel relationship, the rationale for US support is, nevertheless, based on a common political ideology and a unique moral commitment.

AIPAC's power has also been partly derived from its past ability to capitalize on America's preoccupation with

responded it reflected the political bias of the FEC (asked after his opening remarks to the West Coast Model League of Arab States, 27 February 1992, Mills College, CA).

³⁸Curtiss, 1990, p. vi.

the Cold War by presenting Israel as a strategic ally against Soviet expansion in the Middle East.³⁹ This success was (and is) a direct result of the increasing role of Congress in formulating foreign policy and the susceptibility of congressmen to PAC funds because of the high daily cost of maintaining elected office.⁴⁰ In managing this effort, AIPAC usually directs its contributions toward influential members on committees and subcommittees who oversee aid or programs affecting Israel.

Some measure of AIPAC's success is reflected in the 1983-84 congressional elections in which six of the top nine recipients of AIPAC contributions were successfully elected to the Senate while 14 of the top 15 House recipients also won.⁴¹

AIPAC has not only used campaign contributions to influence election results, but it has also withdrawn funds

³⁹President Reagan's perception of Arab-Israeli problems in terms of the East-West conflict lent further importance to Israel because he perceived it as a strategic asset in countering Soviet expansion in the Middle East. Recently, President Bush reaffirmed America's commitment to Israel in *National Security Strategy* (1991, p. 10).

⁴⁰According to figures presented by Dr. David Winterford, a professor of international relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, campaign costs for Senate elections are approximately \$10,000 per day for each day in office. So, for a one year term, campaign costs should be projected at \$3,650,000.00 (NS 3035 lecture, 26 November 1991).

⁴¹Rubenberg, 1986, pp. 370, 371.

from senators who have occasioned to vote against the AIPAC line. Moreover, it often targets congressmen for defeat by contributing money to the opponent. The fate of Illinois Senator Charles Percy⁴² has been referred to in Washington circles as the "Percy factor," a code phrase that "keeps members . . . from breaking ranks when AIPAC calls for their support."⁴³ Tom Dine, head of AIPAC, told a Jewish audience after Percy's defeat, ". . . those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire, got the message."⁴⁴

Another element of domestic political support for AIPAC has been the American public itself, whose backing stems from a variety of factors, not least of which is a moral commitment to ensure Israel's survival.

⁴²"AIPAC decided that Percy was too dangerous in his role as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee" because of his votes concerning the AWACS sales and his insistence on "hearing a variety of viewpoints at committee hearings"; i.e., concern for Palestinian interests (Curtiss, 1990, p. 58). In 1984, pro-Israel stealth-PACs combined against Percy by "contributing heavily to his opponent," Democrat Paul Simon (giving him over \$300,000). Also, "thousands of Jews from all over the nation . . . donated a total of \$3 million to Simon's campaign--40 percent of his total funds." Additionally, Michael Goland, a California businessman, reportedly spent more than \$1 million in anti-Percy advertising. Supporters of Percy filed a complaint with the FEC charging that Goland was acting on behalf of Morris Amitay, ex-president of AIPAC and a supporter of Percy's opponent (Tivnan, 1987, p. 191). Four years later, Goland was fined \$5,000 by the FEC for concealing that he was a source of some of the advertising funds against Percy (Curtiss, 1990, p. 59).

⁴³Curtiss, 1990, p. 59.

⁴⁴Dine quoted in Tivnan (1987, pp. 190-191).

AIPAC has demonstrated a keen ability to nurture public sympathy for Israel which stems in part from American unfamiliarity with, or hostility toward, Arab nations. Contributing to this favorable American opinion is a shared Judeo-Christian heritage, as fundamentalist evangelicals believe the world as a whole will be blessed through the state of Israel (if not an expansion into a greater Israel) because it signals the fulfillment of biblical prophecy--the return of the Messiah. As a result, the evangelicals support a pro-Israeli policy and appear to use congressional politics toward this end.⁴⁵

American Christian Zionists, as they are sometimes called, represent tens of millions of people and are a substantial base of support for AIPAC. In an effort to enhance this interface, AIPAC hired a former legislative aide with ties to the fundamentalists as part of its permanent staff. AIPAC has also sponsored prayer breakfasts in its Capitol Hill branch offices, featuring such fundamentalist leaders as Jimmy Swaggert and Pat Robertson as they break bread with local rabbis. Prime Minister Begin solidified the relationship with the evangelicals when he awarded Jerry Falwell the prestigious Jabotinsky Award for service to Israel.⁴⁶

⁴⁵Schultz, 1979, pp. 44, 83-85.

⁴⁶Tivnan, 1987, pp. 181-182.

Due to the influx of European Jews to the US and Israel (over six million Jews currently live in the US⁴⁷), there also seems to be a cultural affinity between the two countries. Ostensibly, sympathies for Israel among the general public have been consistently higher than sympathies for Arab nations, as measured in various polls from 1947 to 1984. As recently as 1990, for example, Israel was perceived by most people as being a vital US interest. And between 1975 and 1982 public opinion polls showed a consistent trend that indicated a majority of Americans viewed Israelis as being modern, democratic, friendly, reasonable, persecuted, and exploited. Arabs, on the other hand, were perceived as being warlike, bloodthirsty, backward, strangely dressed, and arrogant. The recent spate of terrorist bombings in the US by members of Muslim radical groups, beginning with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, have only increased and perhaps justified anti-Arab, anti-Muslim sentiment. US public opinion is also shaped by the views of American political leaders whose favorable ratings toward Israel have been

⁴⁷About 6.5 million Jews live in the US (2.7 percent of the US population) compared to about 4.5 million Muslims (1.7 percent) (1991 *Britannica Book of the Year*, 1991, p. 725).

consistently higher on opinion polls than the public at large.⁴⁸

4. Implications

According to Tivnan, the effect of US domestic politics is that US Middle East foreign policy is a "propaganda" event. The preoccupation of American policy makers with public opinion, the media, and the political lobby was seen by British analyst, Peter Mansfield, as the major weakness in the formulation of foreign policy in the US. Or as one BBC radio announcer said: "Instead of acting in terms of actual options and constraints . . . successive administrations have usually based their positions on what they think the public/media/lobbies would prefer and consider reasonable."⁴⁹

In short, the implication of domestic politics is that US interests seem to be subordinated to Israel, and it is a situation that begs the question, What has "happened to the debate and analysis so necessary to a genuine Middle East policy?"⁵⁰

But even if it were true that American presidents are less influenced than congressmen by the pro-Israel

⁴⁸Gilboa, 1987, pp. 32, 49, 298-300, 306-307; 310-311, 316-317; Rielly, 1991.

⁴⁹BBC radio broadcast in summer of 1983, cited in Ismael (1986).

⁵⁰Tivnan, 1987, p. 161.

lobby, close political ties have nevertheless existed between Zionists and presidential administrations. This began with President Woodrow Wilson's friendship with Louis Dembitz Brandeis, who headed the American Zionist movement from 1914-1918 and who was appointed by Wilson to the Supreme Court in 1916. The Zionist idea of a homeland for Jews coincided with Wilson's belief in the importance of self-determination.

Truman, on the other hand, had several close Jewish associates, particularly David K. Niles, a former aide to Roosevelt. Sachar in *The Redemption of the Unwanted* (1983) indicated that Truman "gave no speech or authorized any document on the issue of Palestine or the Displaced Persons without Niles' counsel."⁵¹

Subsequent administrations, too, have continued to pursue Jewish support and maintain a strong US-Israel relationship. Kennedy, for one, actively sought the Jewish vote in 1958⁵² and received funds from such Jewish supporters as Abraham Feinberg, a Jewish banker who was considered by Stephen Isaacs, in his book *Jews and American Politics* (1987) "as [being] the first Jewish fund raiser for national

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁵²When Kennedy asked Philip Klutznick, a wealthy Chicago real estate developer and president of *B'nai B'rith*, what the Jews wanted, he told Kennedy that Eisenhower on the Suez was unsatisfactory while Truman in 1948 was on the mark (Tivnan, 1987, p. 53).

politics."⁵³ Cheryl Rubenberg states that Kennedy also "initiated the concept of a special relationship with Israel and began the policy of supplying the Jewish state with sophisticated American weapons."⁵⁴

Furthermore, during the Nixon and Ford administrations, Henry Kissinger, an American Jew with high sympathies for Israel's needs, was appointed first, as the national security advisor and subsequently, as the secretary of state. Of course, Carter also emphasized his American commitment to Israel during his presidential campaign⁵⁵ while, still later, Reagan regarded Israel as a strategic asset during the Cold War. Most recently, President Bill Clinton has been very clear on his unwavering support for Israel and has appointed Martin Indyk, a respected Mideast

⁵³Feinberg was a major backer of Kennedy and had also raised money for Truman (Tivnan, 1987, p. 55).

⁵⁴Such arms transfers began with the sale of HAWK (Homing All the Way) guided missile systems in 1962, tanks in 1964 (under Johnson) and Skyhawk planes in 1966. "These sales marked the beginning of Washington's commitment to assure the absolute regional military superiority of Israel, which has continued to be a cornerstone of US-Israeli relations and of American policy in the Middle East." (Rubenberg, 1986, p. 91)

⁵⁵Carter's commitment was based, on his Christian belief, that a homeland for Jews was mandated by God, and on his political belief, that Israel's survival was important because it was both a democracy and a strategic asset (Lenczowski, 1990a, p. 158).

analyst and vocal supporter of Israel, to direct Middle East affairs for the National Security Council.

Indeed, politicians, if they value their careers, are extremely sensitive to charges of anti-Semitism, and because of this they have taken pains to avoid suffering any such accusations, which are often made with little deliberation or forethought. For example, when President Bush placed a condition on the \$10 billion housing loan guarantee (cessation of new settlements), charges of anti-Semitism were levied against him by members of the American Jewish community. Clearly, one result of such fears is that American foreign policy toward Israel may not be debated as thoroughly as it should be.

V. LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Disparity between what states say and what they do can create an international credibility gap of awesome dimensions from the standpoint of international law.

Michael Van Dusen

The constraints faced by the premier International Government Organization (IGO) operating in the world today, the UN, may also contribute to the lack of progress toward a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is despite the fact that since the birth of the UN almost half a century ago the Palestinian problem has been one of that organization's major concerns. It is at the same time noteworthy that this preoccupation has stimulated a greater variety of mission responsibilities than any other world problem has to date, and today, tasks like mediation services, refugee management, and the supervision of multinational truces have long since been adopted as the UN modus operandi.¹

As an international peacekeeping organization, the UN has a mixed record. On the positive side, the world community has so far been spared from a third world war or a

¹Brown, 1984, p. 251.

nuclear conflagration because of its efforts. Conversely, at least 150 major conflicts have erupted,² with the Arab-Israeli wars counted among them. And although the UN did intervene successfully in several of the Middle East military conflicts, as it did in 1949 and again in 1956, its capability to impart a permanent, peaceful settlement has been limited. As will now be shown, these limitations result from the UN's organizational and juridical constraints, as well as from the conflicting Arab and Israeli interpretations of UN resolutions.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

The UN is comprised of representatives from almost 160 nation-states³ and depends upon the voluntary cooperation between those states to enhance its organizational effectiveness. However, superpower rivalry during the Cold War prevented greater international cooperation during that historic period while UN organizational constraints have limited the UN's ability to concurrently defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1. Veto Power

The Security Council and General Assembly have different levels of authority. Inasmuch as the council is

²Papp, 1991, p. 66.

³As of 1990, 159 states had membership in the General Assembly (Ibid., 64).

empowered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take legally binding actions when international order and stability are threatened, the assembly makes decisions of a recommendatory nature.⁴ Consequently, Security Council resolutions require the unanimous consent of all five permanent members plus four of the ten nonpermanent members;⁵ assembly decisions only need majority approval.

In an attempt to bypass the traditional council gridlock (caused by the all-powerful and frequently-used veto), the General Assembly in 1950 approved the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which imparted residual authority to the assembly whenever unanimity rule in the council was lacking.⁶ This option was utilized, for example, when the Security Council was unable to pass a cease-fire resolution to stop the Suez War of 1956.⁷ In too many instances,

⁴Ibid., p. 64; Lande, 1967, pp. 356, 227.

⁵The permanent members of the Security Council are the victors of WWII (China, France, Great Britain, the United States and Russia). The nonpermanent members are elected by the General Assembly to two-year terms. Collective security measures approved by the council become legally binding on UN member states without further consultation from other UN members. (Papp, 1991, p. 64; Lande, 1967, p. 356)

⁶Halderman, 1969, p. 95.

⁷Israeli forces invaded Egypt on 29 October. An emergency session of the Security Council was held on 30 October, but was unable to agree on an American and Soviet resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire between Israeli and Egyptian forces due to French and British vetoes. The case was transferred to the Assembly where, without the hindrance of unanimity rule, the resolution was

however, the assembly has demonstrated a reluctance to wield this authority.⁸

Traditionally, the aforementioned veto power of Security Council members effectively constrained the ability of the UN to respond to, or to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict. Take the situation in 1956, for instance, when individual interests in the Suez Canal caused Great Britain and France to block the passage of an Egyptian and Israeli cease-fire resolution. And later that year a similar political stalemate occurred when the Soviets vetoed a Security Council resolution calling upon Syria to take stronger measures to halt *fedayeen* (Arab or Palestinian) raids into Israeli territory.⁹

Generally speaking, the superpower rivalry of the Cold War prompted the Soviets to consistently wield their veto power in the UN to oppose American interests;¹⁰ and, passed (Lenczowski, 1990a, p. 532).

⁸Halderman, 1969, p. 95.

⁹Israel's security was increasingly threatened by Arab *fedayeen* raids launched from Jordan, but primarily from Syria, in the latter part of 1956. Israel's appeal to the UN Security Council for intervention prompted six of the members to propose a resolution calling upon Syria to take stronger measures to prevent further raids, but it was vetoed by the Soviet Union (Kortanek, 1978, p. 107).

¹⁰On the other hand, American and Soviet leaders had been in agreement on many Arab-Israeli issues. Both accepted the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate for Palestine; both recognized Israel's statehood in 1948, and both supported the UN cease-fire in 1956, which included the

indeed, the paucity of UN military or economic actions against aggressor nations was often attributed to the Soviet Union, a situation perceived as obstructing the enforcement mechanism as envisaged in Article 43 of the UN Charter.¹¹

2. Financial Dependency

The UN's dependence on member states for monetary support, particularly the US, which is assessed 25 percent of the UN's annual budget,¹² has at the same time enabled Washington to assume a preeminent leadership role in UN affairs. This dependency is most exemplified by the funding crisis of the 1980's when America withheld financial support to the UN in protest against growing anti-Western sentiment during General Assembly meetings.¹³ As a result, there was

withdrawal of British and French forces and Israel's evacuation of the territories it had occupied. (Halderman, 1969, pp. 29-30)

¹¹Wright, 1975, p. 357; The UN has engaged in only three military enforcement activities during its history (only one during the Cold War). The first occurred in 1950 to repel North Korea's attack on South Korea (Papp, 1991, p. 67). The second instance was in 1990 to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the third in 1993 to restore internal order in Somalia. Likewise, economic sanctions have been rare. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, one of the only instances where the use of international sanctions was threatened was in 1956. The threat successfully compelled Israel to withdraw its forces from the Sinai (Kortanek, 1978, p. 102).

¹²US Participation in the UN, 1989.

¹³The American Congress passed a law in 1985 which threatened to reduce American funding to the UN by 5 percent unless the organization changed its rules to permit voting according to level of financial contribution. The US and UK withdrew financial support from the UN Educational,

a marked reduction in anti-American viewpoints and only then did America resume its financial support in 1988 and, thus, its control of the international body.¹⁴

Indeed, any organization such as the UN, which is dependent upon member financing and manpower support, will always be hard-pressed to implement its resolutions. And America, as the largest single-nation contributor to the UN--both financially, and in manning military enforcement activities¹⁵--is integral to most major UN undertakings. Naturally, those resolutions that were antithetical to American interests were never pursued.

To put this all into a Middle East context, domestic US politics, coupled with a foreign policy aimed at Soviet containment, generated a pro-Israel, anti-communist political orientation, which was then directly translated into American support of Israel, particularly when Israel's adversaries (e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) were supported by

Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1986, leading to a revenue loss of 29.6 percent from an annual budget of \$382 million (25 percent provided by US and 4.6 percent by UK). The US also deliberately fell behind in UN payments in 1987 so that by the end of 1990 over \$500 million was owed (Papp, 1991, pp. 76-77).

¹⁴By September 1988, the Reagan administration announced the US would restore its full level of funding. (Ibid.)

¹⁵As was previously mentioned, the UN has engaged in only three military enforcement activities during its history, and in each instance, the US supplied most of the troops and a large share of the finances.

the Soviet Union. As a result, American dominance of the UN effectively allowed the US to constrain the ability of that body to effectively moderate the Arab-Israeli conflict, even when the Soviet Union itself was not blocking peace making efforts. This was in spite of American rhetorical support for UN resolutions that called for Israel's military withdrawal from the occupied territories, the right of return of Palestinians, or other resolutions legitimizing Arab demands. Without American support, economic sanctions or military actions against any of the involved parties were almost never undertaken while, furthermore, Washington continuously sought avenues outside the UN from which to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict--avenues that generally coincided with Israeli demands. The current Middle East peace talks are no exception.

B. JURIDICAL CONSTRAINTS

Besides the aforementioned organizational constraints, juridical constraints further impede the UN's ability to effectively function as a peacekeeping organization. Such constraints result from problems of international law, specifically, the prominence of national sovereignty and the ambiguous status of UN resolutions.

1. National Sovereignty

The issue of national sovereignty has been one of the most pervasive issues facing the UN¹⁶, which by its nature seeks to delimit the behavior of nation-states. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter limits UN authority in this regard, prohibiting it from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," but it also grants broad powers to the UN to employ "enforcement measures" when peace is threatened.¹⁷

Even though states have accepted the obligations of membership, namely, to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes" and to "refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action,"¹⁸ member states have in practice preserved their individual freedoms of action. As a result, compliance with UN recommendations, cooperation with UN sanctions, or adherence to decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are not ensured. Neither can the UN enforce its decisions upon member countries.¹⁹

¹⁶Lande, 1967, p. 355.

¹⁷Tompkins, 1972, p. 113.

¹⁸Article 2(5) of the UN Charter as cited in Tompkins (1972, p. 112).

¹⁹Lande, 1967, p. 227; Papp, 1991, p. 65.

UN sanctions (including peacekeeping operations) often fail because member states place their own interests above international law and because sanctions are implemented in a decentralized fashion, permitting noncompliance. Indeed, such operations require the parties of the conflict, as well as the world community, to accept UN peacekeeping actions, though this congruency happens only rarely.

A member state will also be predisposed to reject the UN's authority if the organization is perceived to be antagonistic, as was the case for Israel, which increasingly became outmatched as newly decolonized Afro-Asian and communist states joined the UN. The resulting solidarity of the Communist bloc and the Third World with the plight of the Palestinians, particularly after the Six-Day War, was soon reflected in General Assembly decisions, which condemned Israeli aggressions and even led to the Zionism is Racism Resolution in 1975 (subsequently repealed in 1991). Underscoring the preeminent role of Israel's national sovereignty and refusal to comply with UN wishes, Israel instead opted for direct negotiations with Arab leaders.

The issue of national sovereignty also places the UN in a difficult position when addressing the problem of internal colonialism. Internal colonialism occurs when one of the nationalities within a state attempts to assert its own nationalism or when a state has removed a nationality

from territories perceived to be its homeland. The position of the UN on this matter has been erratic because of a variety of political, social, economic and military factors. In other words, problems born of internal colonialism are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to mitigate. Because of this, the UN has not yet formally recognized Palestinian claims for statehood although the PLO has been granted observer status at UN proceedings.

2. Ambiguity of UN Resolutions

The status of the General Assembly resolutions remain ambiguous to this day, and it is generally accepted that they are not legally dispositive texts which create or take away rights. Instead, they are considered to be political or moral statements. Indeed, they have become more important as documents legitimizing the actions or claims of nation-states rather than as a collective call for action.²⁰ Yet, despite their recommendatory nature, they are selectively enforced. This begs the question, What factors determine the appropriateness of a resolution for enforcement?

UN Resolution 181 (1947), a recommendation for the Plan of Partition and Economic Union in Palestine, highlights the complexity of this issue and the sketchy UN position regarding enforcement. As stated earlier, General

²⁰Halderman, 1969, p. 66; Papp, 1991, p. 65.

Assembly resolutions are recommendations, but the UN had indicated its intention to enforce the plan in the face of growing Arab violence²¹ and despite the fact Arab states had rejected the recommendation. The implication of enforcement therefore pitted the power of the UN against Arab nationalist desires. But when the Security Council failed to sanction the use of enforcement measures requested by the Palestine Commission, the Partition Plan collapsed; this not only tarnished the reputation of the UN, but questions then resurfaced surrounding the legal status of UN resolutions.

The rationale given for not enforcing the plan was eventually embodied in arguments raised by American and Indian delegates. They contended that, while the UN may be empowered to use temporary force to maintain international security, it was not empowered to use force on a permanent basis to uphold an arrangement unacceptable to the majority of the population, even if such an arrangement was pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or Security Council.²² In other words, the Security Council could not

²¹Halderman, 1969, p. 88.

²²UN General Assembly Official Record (GAOR), 2d Special Session, 1st Comm., p. 64 (1948) and UN Security Council Official Record (SCOR), 253d meeting, pp. 265-267 (1948) (Halderman, 1969, pp. 82-83).

compel the Palestinians to comply with a political arrangement with which they opposed.

C. ARAB AND ISRAELI VIEWS OF UN RESOLUTIONS

Another obstacle limiting the effectiveness of the UN in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is the unreconciled problem of conflicting Arab and Israeli interpretations of UN resolutions. Indeed, General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have addressed issues ranging from territorial sovereignty to refugee rights, but they have been interpreted differently by Arabs and Israelis. The following will examine some of the more pertinent differences.

1. Partition Plan

When Britain relinquished its Mandate of Palestine and called upon the UN to provide for its future government, Resolution 181 was passed. The resolution designated the division of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states and the internationalization of Jerusalem and the holy places, placing them under UN administration. The plan was supported by the US, the Soviet Union, and the Zionists (though Israel was not a member of the UN at that time).²³

Arab leaders, on the other hand, maintained that the Partition Plan violated Article 80 of the Charter, which

²³Wright, 1975, pp. 14-15; Halderman, 1969, pp. 80-81; Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 38-40.

specifies that the peoples of Palestine had to consent to any change in the status of the mandated territory.²⁴ They failed by one vote, however, in turning their appeal to the ICJ²⁵ and resorted to the familiarity of armed struggle to alter the terms of the UN resolution.²⁶

As Israel expanded its territorial control after 1949, Arab and Israeli leaders subsequently reversed their positions on Resolution 181--precisely because their respective predicaments were now also reversed. After West

²⁴"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties." Article 80, section 1, quoted in Wright (1975, p. 16).

²⁵Eight questions were submitted to the ICJ for advisory opinions regarding the interpretations of commitments, obligations, and responsibilities growing out of the administration of Palestine under the League of Nations and the competence of the UN to recommend partition or trusteeship without the consent of the inhabitants by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Seven of the eight questions were defeated with 25 votes against, 18 for, and 11 abstentions. The eighth question (defeated by 21 to 20, with 13 abstentions) pertained to "whether the United Nations or any of its member states, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine." UN GAOR Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Annex 25, pp. 300-301, UN Doc. A/AC.14/32 and Add. I (1947), (id. 203), cited in Elaraby, (1969, p. 102)

²⁶UN SCOR, Spec. Supp. 2, p. 11, UN Doc. S/676 (1948), cited in Rosenne (1969, p. 50).

Jerusalem fell to Israeli hands during the War of Liberation, and then proclaimed as Israel's capital in 1949, government leaders defended their actions by saying the Arabs had invalidated the Partition Plan when they attacked the city. The Arabs, however, countered those arguments with their own assertions that they were entitled to reject recommendations of the General Assembly and that Israel's seizure of West Jerusalem was a violation of Resolution 181.²⁷

Israel's capture of East Jerusalem in 1967 then led to efforts to rebuild a united Jerusalem and soon, there were new cries of foul play from the Arabs. In response, two General Assembly resolutions, adopted without opposition in July of 1967 (the second of these won by a vote of 100 to 0, with 18 abstentions including the US),²⁸ determined that the unification of Jerusalem was invalid and, as such, they called upon Israel to "rescind all measures already taken" and "to desist" from further actions "which would alter the status of Jerusalem."²⁹

But Israel refused to comply on several grounds, claiming that: first, Jordan had violated the 1949 armis-

²⁷Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 40-42; Halderman, 1969, p. 86.

²⁸Record of General Assembly Debate, UN Doc. A/PV. 1554, p. 41, cited in Jones (1969, p. 170).

²⁹Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 40-42; Jones, 1969, p. 170.

tice agreement by refusing to grant Jews access to the Wailing Wall; second, Jordan was responsible for initiating the attack on Jerusalem and should therefore accept the consequences of its defeat; third, since the international community tolerated Jordan's unilateral control over the holy places, it could also tolerate Israel's control;³⁰ fourth, the institution of divisions and barriers would only sharpen existing tensions and generate discrimination; and finally, the integration of Jerusalem did not foreclose a final settlement which would secure appropriate expressions to the three great religions at a future date.³¹

Conversely, the Arabs rejected Israel's civil incorporation of Jerusalem into Israel by reiterating earlier arguments of 1949 that Israel violated the acknowledged rule of international law, which prohibited an occupying power from changing the legal and administrative structure in the occupied territory, and also that Israel violated the principle of self-determination, which is a protected right as described in both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.³²

³⁰Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 42-50; Jones, 1969, p. 170.

³¹Exchange of letters between the secretary-general of the UN and the Israeli foreign minister, 15 July 1967 and 11 September 1967, published in UN Doc. A/6793, pp. 29, 30, cited in Jones (1969, p. 170).

³²UN Doc. A/6793, p. 7, cited in Jones (1969, p. 171).

2. Occupied Territories

The issue of the occupied territories--acquiring land by force and trading it for peace--comprises a second area of unreconciled Arab and Israeli viewpoints, as a debate is still raging with regards to which side is the true aggressor.

Israel, for one, has defended its initial expansion outside the areas of the 1947 Partition Plan and its successive expansion after 1967 by placing the blame of both instances of aggression on Arab states. Israelis believe the Arabs have only themselves to blame for the current state of affairs, because once they had engaged Israel in a war, the Arabs effectively relinquished all claim to the land, as the spoils of war have traditionally been awarded to the victor.

Arab supporters, on the other hand, contend that the Israelis are the true aggressors. They recount Zionist aims, expressed prior to the 1948 war, to gain ultimate control of Palestine and to transfer the Arab population to Iraq and surrounding areas.³³ They also point to Jewish massacres at Deir Yassin and attacks on Arab-inhabited Jaffa³⁴ just weeks before the start of the 1948 war--

³³Tomeh, 1969, pp. 120-121.

³⁴The Zionist attack on Jaffa three weeks prior to the 1948 war, prompted 400,000 Arabs to flee, and further supported Arab contentions that the origination of Arab

evidence, they say, of Israel's intention to provoke Arab retaliation.

Arab contention that Israel had violated Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter (by acquiring territory through forceful measures³⁵) was also a substantial argument. However, the Arab case has been undermined by their own contradictory stances in other, similar, cases. For example, in December 1961 the United Arab Republics (UAR) not only condoned India's use of force to annex several Portuguese colonies, but they also sponsored a proposal to justify that force and to declare the colonies as a constituent threat to regional peace.³⁶ In short, the prior UN voting positions of Arab states, along with the USSR, helped to undermine a stronger and more effective rule against the seizure of territory by force (and, hence, the

refugees began even before Arab troops stepped on Palestinian soil (Tomeh, 1969, p. 122).

³⁵"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations," the UN Charter as quoted by Halderman (1969, p. 89).

³⁶When India used force to annex several Portuguese colonies, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic defeated a draft UN resolution in the Security Council calling for the withdrawal of Indian forces (16 UN SCOR, 988 meeting, pp. 26-27 (1961)). Moreover, the UAR sponsored another proposal which declared that the colonies constituted a threat to international peace, thereby justifying India's use of force (Ibid.).

principle of self-determination), which they claimed Israel had violated.

Arabs and Israelis have also held differing interpretations of UN Security Council Resolution 242. For while the resolution was accepted by all council members and Arab states bordering Israel (except Syria, and only with serious qualifications by Israel),³⁷ it has not been effective in reversing Israel's occupation policies, and likewise it has not precluded Israel's subsequent annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

Ze'ev Begin, a member of the Likud party elected to the Knesset, has written on this subject and his views illustrate the Israeli consensus. Begin believes that differing interpretations of Resolution 242 underscore the need for face-to-face negotiations and that the narrow interpretation of 242 as a land-for-peace resolution signifies an unacceptable precondition that invalidates the negotiating process. He maintains that Arabs have erroneously interpreted the resolution to imply that Palestinians have the right to self-determination, that "territories occupied" does not equate to territories "on all fronts," and also that the desired withdrawal of Israel's armed

³⁷Wright, 1975, p. 18.

forces does not imply a withdrawal of Israel's administration or "any other aspect of its sovereignty."³⁸

Shabtai Rosenne, former ambassador and deputy permanent representative of Israel to the UN, adds, the withdrawal of Israel's military forces does not imply a corresponding advance of armed forces from an Arab state, nor does it determine territorial sovereignty over the occupied areas. In confirming this viewpoint, Eugene V. Rostow, who helped draft Resolution 242 when he served as the American undersecretary of state for political affairs in 1967, is reputed to have considered Israel's return of the Sinai in 1982--an area constituting over 90 percent of the occupied territories--to have essentially satisfied the intent of the resolution, even if Israel returned all or none of the West Bank to Jordan.³⁹

In sum, the Israelis regard the general objective of securing a "just and lasting peace"⁴⁰ to be the most important facet of the resolution with details to be

³⁸Begin, 1991, pp. 25-26.

³⁹Rosenne, 1969, p. 61; Metz, 1990, p. 73; Begin, 1991, p. 25.

⁴⁰Resolution 242 is the first resolution to call for a "just and lasting peace" after a long history of earlier resolutions which omitted that phrase. Because of the political implications involved with the word peace, the Arab states and their friends in the UN were able to obtain the voting strength needed to virtually omit that phrase in earlier UN decisions (Rosenne, 1969, p. 57).

resolved during the negotiation process,⁴¹ while the Arabs view Resolution 242 as a plan of implementation for Palestinian autonomy.

3. Refugee Issue

The issue of the Palestinian refugees comprises a third area of positional ambiguity between Arabs and Israelis. As complex a problem as perhaps any other involving Jews and Arabs, there still exists basic, unresolved issues that pertain to such matters as the actual number of Arab refugees displaced because of the conflict, the onus of responsibility for those refugees, and the right of return and compensation for all affected people.

First of all, successive waves of refugees⁴² have made it difficult for both sides to agree on the numbers of people actually displaced because of the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, they are indeed many, and a good-faith estimate based on UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) figures is herewith provided.

The first of the Palestinians refugees emerged in 1947 and 1948 when they escaped during the turmoil of Israel's birth as a nation-state. Comprising almost 1,500,000 people, they are generally known as the *old*

⁴¹Begin, 1991, p. 25.

⁴²Van Dusen, 1975, p. 61; Tomeh, 1969, pp. 110-111.

refugees. The generation born to the old refugees after May of 1948 are also considered refugees.

A second category, the *intermediate refugees*, includes over 11,000 Arab inhabitants of the demilitarized zones between Israel and neighboring Arab states, who were expelled from Israel after July 1, 1952. Lastly, the 234,000 Arab victims of the 1967 war originally from Jordan, Syria and the Sinai Peninsula are known as the *new refugees*. Together with about 100,000 of the old refugees, mentioned above, they fled even further away from Israel when their camps were overrun by the Israeli army during the initial moments of the Six-Day War. According to George Tomeh, permanent representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, their numbers increase daily as a result of Israeli actions to "empty the Arab lands of their Arab inhabitants."⁴³

As was mentioned earlier, the Israelis and Arabs blame each other for the refugee situation. From Israel's point of view, the Palestinians became refugees only because they complied with Arab promulgations to leave their homes and join the United Arab Army in its quest to liberate Palestine. But this claim is disputed by Arab leaders who argue that, not only were the Palestinians asked to remain in their villages, but those who did leave were forced to do

⁴³Tomeh, 1969, p. 111.

so in the face of Jewish terrorist raids in areas that were strategically or demographically important to Israel.⁴⁴

What is more, the refugee problem, from the Arab perspective, is simply a result of the establishment and recognition of the state of Israel on Palestinian land, and therefore the UN and Israel are the ones who are wholly responsible for the refugee problem.

That most Arab states do not grant citizenship rights to Palestinians residing within their national borders⁴⁵ exacerbates the refugee situation even while it propagates the Middle East conflict into the future. Dr. Abdel Salam Majali, head of the Jordanian peace delegation, predicted Arab statesmen would undoubtedly continue this practice should the Middle East peace talks fail because such a measure is advantageous to the Palestinian crusade. He also remarked that when Jordan granted citizenship rights

⁴⁴Van Dusen, 1975, p. 58; Tomeh, 1969, p. 121.

⁴⁵The Palestinians acquired a melange of legal statuses in a number of Arab countries after the British mandate ended in 1948. Jordan granted them citizenship in 1950, which included Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip. Other Arab states granted a combination of full or partial citizenship on a selective basis while elsewhere Palestinians are regarded as resident aliens. (Amos, 1988, p. 368)

to Palestinians in 1950, the country was attacked by Palestinians who believed Jordan had betrayed their cause.⁴⁶

Another tactic for keeping the Palestinian problem in the forefront has been through the perpetuation of refugee camps. Palestinian leaders have steadfastly refused to let their people escape from the squalor of the camps to resettle into new, modern housing.⁴⁷ By denying the integration of their people into existing states and communities, Palestinians hope to apply pressure on Israel; essentially, they refuse to heal the wounds of conflict and suffering until their goal of statehood is achieved.

For the Arabs, the Palestinian issue embodies both the right of self-determination (based on natural law) and the right of return (based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), December 11, 1948). The former, however, is regarded by Israel as an Arab attempt to rationalize their refusal to cooperate with resettlement efforts of Palestinian refugees while the latter is considered an attempt to win international support for planting a Trojan horse in Israel's midst. Israel also questions Arab sincerity on the issue of self-determination because it was they, not the Zionists, who rejected the partition plan providing for an

⁴⁶Discussion with Dr. Abdel Salam Majali following his briefing to the Monterey Chapter of the World Affairs Council, Monterey, CA, 12 September 1992.

⁴⁷Shipler, 1987, p. 55.

Arab state for Palestinians, and likewise, when the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under Jordanian and Egyptian control, respectively, the issue of self-determination never arose.⁴⁸

What further haunts the Arab cause and undermines the strength of their position is their perceived hypocritical voting pattern regarding the issue of self-determination in cases heard before the General Assembly. Both the Indian case cited earlier, and the West Irian case, in which Indonesia threatened the use of force to take over areas of disputed territory, are examples.

With regards to West Irian, a proposed General Assembly resolution to resolve the matter peacefully and to recognize the principle of self-determination failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for passage, with the UAR, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the USSR voting against the resolution.⁴⁹

But whatever Israel may think, the right of return for those Palestinians who left their homes during the turbulent period of 1947-48 is indeed contained in UN Resolution 194 (1948), which says in part, "The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with

⁴⁸Rosenne, 1969, pp. 51, 65; discussion with Dr. Ralph Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1992.

⁴⁹UN GAOR 873, 875 (1961), cited in Halderman (1969, p. 90).

their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date."⁵⁰ Resolution 194 also affirms their right to compensation if they choose not to return, as well as compensation for loss of, or damage to property.⁵¹ Not surprisingly, though, there is a bilateral failure to correctly define such questions as, Who determines which refugees will live at peace with their neighbors? And how will they be compensated?

Nevertheless, these seem to be moot questions, as Israeli leaders have traditionally refrained from agreeing on a settlement of the refugee problem (through repatriation, compensation or resettlement) except as part of a final peace treaty with international guarantees for Israel's security. In fact, they employ Resolution 242 only to justify their approach that the refugee problem should be placed in the overall political context of the conflict within which a solution must be designed. Conversely, Arab leaders have decided to resolve the refugee problem as an initial step because they do not believe peace is possible until that is accomplished.⁵²

⁵⁰Quoted by Haberman (1992).

⁵¹UN GAOR, Resolutions, pp. 21, 24 (1948) (Tomeh, 1969, p. 118).

⁵²Van Dusen, 1975, p. 59; Rosenne, 1969, p. 66.

But even though Israel has permitted the return of some Palestinians (it offered to allow 7,000 Arabs to return in December, 1968)⁵³, it is doubtful that it will support the return of 2.6 million Arab refugees to an already crowded and turbulent land; for to do so would present grave security⁵⁴ and economic problems for Israel's 4.1 million Jews and would quite possibly destroy the very ideological foundation of the Zionist state.

The matter of compensation is an equally difficult matter to resolve, especially when both sides view the other from across a wide rift of disagreement. Although Israel may not directly contest the issue of compensation, it has added a number of caveats to the Arab demand that the principles of repatriation and compensation be based on the solutions presented by the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress for German reparations after WWII. Israel insists that: compensation would be offset by the continuing economic effects of the Arab boycott; compensation would be further offset by the compensation owed to Jewish refugees who were forced to abandon their properties in Arab countries to find safety in Israel; compensation would be comprised of a lump sum releasing

⁵³Israel's offer was derided by the Arabs as a mere token (Van Dusen, 1975, p. 62).

⁵⁴Haberman, 1992; Van Dusen, 1975, pp. 59-60.

Israel from all individual claims; the amount compensated would be part of a final peace settlement and thus subject to negotiation; and, international financial assistance would be required. Essentially, it seems that Israel is inclined to dismiss the issue of compensation, and prefers to view the Arab refugee problem more along the lines of a population exchange.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Rosenne, 1969, pp. 67; Tomeh, 1969, p. 118; Van Dusen, 1975, p. 60.

VI. INCENTIVES FOR PEACE

There is a need for a settlement. Without it, there will be wars and bloodshed [and] the marginalization of the Middle East.

Yehoshafat Harkabi

Were it not for the seriousness of the potential consequences, the constant bickering of the Arab and Israeli peace delegates over procedural details would seem almost comical. Indeed, the constant barrage of sniping continues to delay the difficult process of negotiating over substantive issues regarding Palestinian statehood and a viable land-for-peace formula. Certainly, such behavior seems counterproductive, particularly in the case of Israel, which has been confronted with imminent destruction since its inception as a state in 1948. Such posturing seems even more irrational when the incentives for a peaceful solution are considered. These would include the enhancement of national and regional security, the redirection of defense spending into real economic growth, and finally, the capitalization of an opportunity for regional and world support after the demise of the Soviet threat and the

simultaneous rise of an unprecedented US-European-Arab alliance after the 1990 Gulf War.

A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL STABILITY

Perhaps the most compelling reason for a Middle East settlement is the preclusion of another Arab-Israeli war. There are those within Israel who, echoing the warnings of Zionists Martin Buber and Judah Magnes at the beginning of the twentieth century¹, urge their leaders to choose a "Zionism of quality, not of acreage."² The assumption of course, is that the extent of Israel's settlement activity is not irreversible, in contrast to Benvenisti's assessment.³ At the same time, more and more Arab leaders are calling upon fellow statesmen to make a historic compromise even as Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan acknowledges, "No problem that has endured as long, has cost as many lives, has engendered as much distrust, hatred, and discord as the Arab-Israeli conflict can have a cost-free solution."⁴

¹Buber, 1983, pp. 220-223; Magnes, 1972, pp. 441-449.

²Harkabi, 1987.

³Meron Benvenisti's argument of irreversibility has been disproved by history, case in point being the 1,000,000 Frenchmen who left Algeria after 130 years of occupation (Ibid.).

⁴Hassan quoted in Talal (1990).

But without a diplomatic settlement, the next Arab-Israeli conflagration is likely to be total war, "not only in the sense of everybody being a prospective participant . . . but also in the sense of everybody being a prospective victim."⁵ Iraq's missile launches against Israeli population centers, and the subsequent engagement of Israel's people during chemical attack alerts are vivid reminders of what could happen if another war were allowed to once more spiral out of control. Indeed, the proliferation of advanced arms, ballistic missiles, and unconventional weapons within the small geographic area of the Middle East, coupled with Israel's loss of its nuclear monopoly to Pakistan since the mid-1980s,⁶ and perhaps to Iran in 1992⁷, raises not just the fear of war, but now, the specter of Armageddon.⁸

⁵Morganthau, 1985, p. 399.

⁶SIPRI 1991 YEARBOOK, 1991, pp. 324-343; Goldblatt and Lomas, 1987.

⁷Possible Iranian purchase of tactical nuclear warheads from the Central Asian republics in early 1992 and reports Iran was seeking nuclear weapons technology from China in the fall of 1991 led to a week-long International Atomic Energy inspection, which concluded Iran's nuclear program was entirely peaceful ("Atom Agency Finds No Threat in Iran", 1992).

⁸The final great battle of Armageddon will occur in northern Israel and extend down the Valley of Jezreel, below the mountain of Armageddon. The name Armageddon comes from Har for "mountain" and the ancient city of Megiddo which overlooks the plain. The area is also known as the Valley of Jehoshaphat (the valley of God's judgment). According to

A resolution of the conflict can also immediately serve to enhance the prestige of its participants. Verily, with the stroke of a pen Israel could achieve status as a sovereign nation with de jure borders;⁹ it could receive explicit Arab recognition regarding its existence as a state and begin to proceed toward regional economic integration.¹⁰ At the same time, the Palestinians would at the very least shed the yoke of Israeli rule while, for Syria, the return of all or a portion of the Golan Heights will surely be considered a political plum.

Jordan, too, would benefit from a Middle East peace as it would no longer fear another wave of radicalized Palestinian refugees streaming across its borders. Moreover, Jordan would gain a more equitable water allocation, and would enjoy a mutual security arrangement with Israel as their border issues become settled. This is not to mention that King Hussein, stricken with cancer, would always be

Revelation (16:16), this ancient battle ground will be the scene of the most devastating military confrontation in human history (Jeffrey, 1990, p. 147).

⁹Legally, Israel has no borders beyond those stated in the 1947 UN resolution; the armistice lines of 1949 and 1967 merely established cease-fire lines (Wright, 1975, pp. 13-34).

¹⁰Arab economic boycott of Israel has been in effect since Israel's establishment as a nation in 1948 (Lenczowski, 1990a, p. 809).

remembered for having left a legacy of peace and hope for his people and for all the Middle East.¹¹

Just as the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict have so ruefully affected the region and their superpower patrons, peace, on the other hand, would elevate the region's sociopolitical, economic, and military stability, as well as the international status of the external players, particularly the US. Moreover, with the security of Israel ensured, America's relations with the Zionist state would follow a more normalized track as its policies in the region would become less constrained and more even-handed--a factor that would in the long-term help to underpin a lasting peace for all participants.

B. ECONOMIC GROWTH

The end of the Arab-Israeli Cold War would also signal an opportunity for real economic growth. In Israel and Syria, for example, about one-third of all current government outlays is on defense,¹² with Israel's military expenditures amounting to \$3.24 billion in 1991 and Syria's amounting to \$3.10.¹³ And while foreign military

¹¹Harkabi, 1987; "King Hussein Addresses Nation", 1992.

¹²Drysdale and Blake, 1985, pp. 307-308; Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, p. 45.

¹³Military expenditure figures may include costs for internal security as well for defense (*The Military Balance 1992-1993*, p. 219).

assistance has offset some of those costs, real economic damage has nevertheless resulted from the collapse of internal capital formation¹⁴ and the scarcity of foreign investments because of regional instability.

Capital investments in Israel have also been diverted from private sectors into the expense of maintaining the occupation of the territories captured in 1967. Not only has the government subsidized housing projects designed to encourage Israeli settlement in the territories, it has maintained separate infrastructures for Jews and Arabs, and has absorbed additional defense costs from occupation, which require an outlay greater than the annual growth rate of the gross national product (GNP).¹⁵ At the same time, Israel continues to also suffer from the effects of primary and secondary Arab economic boycotts.¹⁶

C. THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crystallization of new regional alliances following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the window of opportunity for an Arab-Israeli peace is currently open. The end of almost five decades of

¹⁴Grose, 1985, pp. 67, 70.

¹⁵Rossant and others, 1991, pp. 48-49; Peretz, 1986, pp. 61, 75.

¹⁶Grose, 1985, pp. 67, 70; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have recently lifted the secondary economic boycott (Indyk, 1991).

superpower rivalry has negated the ability of regional states to exploit that hostility for their own ends and, once and for all, it has increased the likelihood that Arab and Israeli concerns can be viewed on their individual merits. The end of the Cold War has also led to a congruence of American and Russian aims which serve to guide the behavior of former client states toward political reconciliation.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, this political global warming has resulted in America's unchallenged dominance in the region and also the emergence of better ties with the former Soviet-backed states, Syria and Iran.

The shifting alliances in the post-Cold War era also bode well for peace. Syria's participation in the American-led coalition in Desert Storm "confirmed its desire to move back into the Arab mainstream,"¹⁸ and Israel's restraint in the face of Iraqi missile attacks may have increased its stature among Arab leaders. Meanwhile, the PLO may have become more susceptible to American and Saudi political leverage as it makes amends for backing Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. And Jordan's King Hussein is believed to have a personal motivation to seek peace with Israel within the time-lines of his terminal illness. A draft

¹⁷Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, pp. 7-8; Rubenstein, 1991; Indyk, 1991/92b.

¹⁸Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 1991, p. 8.

Israeli-Jordanian agreement, published in early November 1992,¹⁹ could, if capitalized upon by other peace delegates, provide the format for comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighboring states and between Israel and the Palestinians. However, the chance for peace would be lost if representatives take issue with the agreement and believe it comprises a separate peace treaty.

The US, an integral player of past Arab-Israeli peace efforts, has taken an active (if not wholehearted) pledge to initiate these talks and push-start any stalls in return for Arab support it received during Desert Storm. Additionally, Saddam Hussein's abuse of the Palestinian issue has prompted Saudi Arabia to demonstrate its leadership in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, noticeably through overt support of American diplomatic efforts and by undertaking an unofficial role as co-sponsor of the talks by underwriting Russia's financial share.²⁰

Former Secretary of State James Baker's statement that the gulf coalition provided a "hopeful reminder that Israel

¹⁹The agreement seeks "to establish a just and comprehensive peace between the Arab countries, the Palestinians, and Israel" based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The agreement regarding the agenda of discussion includes security, refugees, water allocations, natural and human resources, borders, curtailment of weapons of mass destruction, tourism and infrastructure. The agreement will be concluded with a peace treaty between the two countries. ('Inbari, 1992, pp. 3-4)

²⁰Indyk, 1991/92b.

and the Arab states sometimes find common ground"²¹ should not be lost on deaf ears as Arab and Israeli statesmen continue to face the difficult task of negotiation. Inevitably, the window of opportunity will not last long as other foreign and domestic issues command American attention. Unless the participants are willing to capitalize upon this chance for peace, they may ultimately contribute to their own marginalization from American and world interest--a serious consequence when considering the past diplomatic failures of regional statesmen.²²

²¹Baker, 1991.

²²Rubenstein, 1991, p. 53; Indyk, 1991/92b, pp. 90-93; Harkabi, 1987.

VII. CONCLUSION

The journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step.

Chinese Proverb

Compelling arguments exist for peace, though they have not yet been able to offset the opposing and more powerful forces playing upon the motivations of each of the major players in the Middle East peace talks. Indeed, unshakable forces such as the twin pillars of ideology and security have guided the people of Israel through the inception, birth, and evolution of their young nation while at the same time those same dynamics have exacerbated relations with the indigenous populations of the occupied territories.

The ebb and flow of hostilities continues even to this day and, in fact, the existence of those hostilities has now come to be accepted as the normal order of life for an Arab or a Jew. According to Shipler, conflict has become "comfortable to both sides," perhaps, because in the presence of conflict, "the definitions are clean."¹

But on the positive front, the recent victory of Yitzhak Rabin and his Labor party has clearly demonstrated an

¹Shipler, 1987, p. 77.

Israeli mandate for peace. With that portentous turn of events may perhaps come a reciprocal commitment by the Palestinians to compromise even further, if only to remove the yoke of Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This hope aside, the political will to resolve the Arab-Israeli deadlock, nevertheless, seems lacking at present. On all fronts, the status quo has become entrenched, both for what it can provide to the players in terms of material benefits, prestige, and security, and for what it evokes if it were to be taken away, i.e., the fear of the unknown.

In addition, the ability of regional leaders to effect a new peace has been further diminished by internal factiousness, competing interests or, simply, the lack of a viable peace plan. Moreover, peace is not in everyone's interest--witness the recent spates of Israeli border violence being perpetrated by Islamic guerrillas in an apparent attempt to scuttle further peace initiatives.

Without a doubt, the territories which fell to Israel during the 1967 War represent the greatest issue of contention. Comprising about one-third of Israel's pre-1967 land mass, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are not insignificant to Israel's geography or strategic interests, and neither have the Arab countries nor the Palestinians been able to stop Israel's

annexation of those precious lands.² In fact, Arab efforts to dislodge Israeli claims have more often than not only contributed to the deeper entrenchment of the Israeli position.

Nor has the US been able to effect a resolution. While political willpower remains a determining factor in the capability of the US to intervene effectively in the Middle East, perhaps the US offer to help guarantee Israel's security in return for a withdrawal from the Golan Heights will be catalyst enough for the Arabs and Israelis to reach a comprehensive peace agreement.

Arabs and Israelis have suffered decades of war and conflict. The talks are almost two years old, but there is not much else to report. Verily, the status quo remains firmly entrenched.

But is any one side to blame for the pathetic state of affairs?

Of course, some say it is the Jews who are at fault; for their establishment of a Zionist state in a land with a mixed population of Jews and Arabs; for their regional provocations and ruthless corrective responses to perceived and actual Arab hostilities; and for their subsequent refusal to trade land for peace.

²Metz, 1990, p. xvi.

Others, however, maintain the fault should be laid upon the doorstep of the Arabs; for their early rejection of a two-state solution; for their hateful rhetoric and terrorist activities aimed at the destruction of Israel; and for the continued exploitation of the Palestinian issue by Palestinians and Arabs alike.

As this analysis suggests, though, the answer to the question of culpability is that there is no clear instigator. Indeed, the cycle of events in the region is so completely intertwined now that it is all but impossible to tell who is reacting to whom, or even, who is shooting at whom. In fact, one of the few obvious facts regarding the Middle East situation is that people are dying. Come to think of it, Jews and Arabs have more in common than they realize.

APPENDIX A

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

(22 November 1967)¹

The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

¹Taken from Wright (1975, p. 18).

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

APPENDIX B

A CHRONOLOGY

Period of Wanderings (2000 B.C to 1200 B.C.):

2000-1200: Led by Abraham, the Hebraic tribe leaves Babylo-
nia to wander in the land of Canaan. Joseph takes the Jews
to Egypt. Pharaohs enslave them.

1200-1100: Moses leads the Jews out of Egypt. Jews return
to Palestine and conquer the Canaanites.

Period of Independence (1200 B.C to 800 B.C.):

1100-800: Era of Hebrew sovereignty. Palestine divided by
Jews into the North Kingdom (Israel) and the South Kingdom
(Judah).

Assyrian and Babylonian Dominations (800 B.C. to 500 B.C.):

800-700: Israel conquered by Assyrians; its people taken
captive and dispersed.

700-500: Babylonians conquer Judah; deport Jews and destroy
Jerusalem and the Jewish Temple.

Persian Dominance (500 B.C. to 300 B.C.):

500-400: Persians defeat Babylonians; allow Jews to return
to Palestine. Jewish Temple rebuilt.

400-334: Second return of Jews from Babylon under Ezra.

Greco-Roman Period (300 B.C. to A.D. 300):

334-322: Jews come under Grecian influence when Alexander
the Great conquers Palestine. First contact with the West.

300-100: Old Testament translated into Greek. Foundations
for Christianity laid. Palestine repeatedly conquered.

100-1: Palestine conquered by Romans. Jesus Christ born.

1-100: Christ crucified by Romans. First Jewish uprising against Roman oppression. Titus destroys Jerusalem and second Jewish Temple.

100-200: Second and third Jewish rebellions. Bar Kochba insurrection. Palestine devastated and made off-limits to Jews. Beginning of the Jewish Diaspora.

200-300: Jews permitted to resettle in Palestine.

Pre-Medieval and Medieval Period (300 to 1800):

300-600: First laws limiting rights of non-Christians. Papacy established. Jews surrounded by Christianity.

570: Birth of Prophet Muhammad.

500-1100: Masses of Jews forced to convert to Christianity in Spain. Jews invited to settle in Italy, France, Germany, England and become Europe's middle class.

632: A series of Moslem dynasties and empires begin in the Middle East.

1100-1300: Jews flee Rhineland in wake of Crusades. Settle in liberal Poland. First ritual murders and burning of Talmud. Jews banished from England.

1300-1500: Jews banished from France (1400), Spain and Portugal (1500). Persecutions become economically motivated. Jewish commercial interests decline in West and grow in East.

1500-1700: Jews relegated to ghettos in Italy, Germany, Central Europe. Jews settle in Russia. Jews readmitted to England, Holland, France.

1700-1800: Rise of *Hasidism* (mystical Judaism). Beginnings of psychological anti-Semitism.

1800: Haskalah is born. Enlightenment in Western Europe sweeps Jews to high posts in literature, finance and politics. Become members of Europe's elite.

1881: Pogroms begin against Jews in Europe. Russian Jews initiate large-scale immigration to the US.

1882: First Aliyah to Palestine (23,000 Jews immigrate) and ends in 1903.

1894: Conviction of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French Army for treason.

1896: Theodor Herzl founds political Zionism.

Arab-Israeli Conflict (1900 to present):

1903: Second Aliyah (40,000 new immigrants) begins, supported by Zionist Congress, which buys land for settling immigrants. Beginnings of Labor party. Second Aliyah ends in 1917.

1915-1916: Hussein-McMahon letters pledging Britain's support of Arab nationalism in return for Arab help against the Turks during World War I. Areas designated for postwar Arab independence were unclear but includes the Arabian Peninsula (except Aden), the Fertile Crescent of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, excluding those areas of interest to France.

1917: Balfour Declaration pledges Britain's support of Zionism through the creation of a homeland for Jews in Palestine; through the declaration, Britain hopes American Jews will favor US intervention in WWI on Britain's behalf and also that Russian Jews will keep Russia in the war.

1918-1923: End of WWI and Moslem Ottoman control over Palestine and the Middle East. Third Aliyah (84,000 new immigrants). The Histadrut and the Haganah (forerunner to the present day Israeli Defense Force) are established. Britain sets quotas for Jewish immigration into Palestine.

1923 (September): British mandate established in Palestine.

1924-1939: Fourth and Fifth Aliyahs. Comprised of economic and political refugees from Eastern Europe due to the rise of nationalism, the Great Depression of 1929, and the rise of Hitler in Germany.

1936-1939: Palestinian revolt. Arabs demand cessation of Jewish immigration, end of further land sales to Jews, and establishment of an Arab national government.

1939 (May): British White Paper released to announce the end of Britain's commitment to the Balfour Declaration, curtailment of immigration and land sales. White Paper is rejected by Jews and Arabs alike. Despite American and international opposition, Britain continues to enforce the White Paper.

1939-1945: WWII. The Holocaust; Nazis murder 12 million people--six million of them Jews.

1947: UN General Assembly Resolution 181 passes to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The Zionist General Council states its willingness to accept partition; the League of Arab States says it will prevent implementation.

1948 (March): First clandestine shipment of heavy arms arrives in Israel from Czechoslovakia. Irgun's massacre of 250 Arab civilians at Dayr Yasin prompts flight of Arab populations from areas with large Jewish communities.

1948 (May): State of Israel is born. Israel's statehood recognized by the US and Soviet Union and 53 other nations, including Britain. Israel is invaded by Arab military forces from Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and smaller numbers from Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Israel's victory brings additional territories under Israeli sovereignty than was provided for in the 1947 UN partition plan.

1949: Armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan. Israel admitted into the UN.

1950: Establishment of Tripartite Agreement between France, US and UK to ration weapon sales to Middle East. Ends in 1955, a year after France's defection from the agreement, with a secret sale of major weapons to Israel.

1953: Passage of the Land Acquisition Law which authorizes the government of Israel to seize properties not in possession of its owners or earmarked by Israel for essential development, settlement or security. This law affects refugees living outside Israel's territory as well as Arabs in Israel displaced by the war of 1948.

1950-1955: Violations of armistice boundaries by Israel and Arab states. Israel attacks Arab villages in Kibya and Nahhalin in Jordan (1953), Egyptian military headquarters in the Gaza strip (1955), and Syrian village east of the Sea of Galilee (1955).

1955: Egypt turns to Soviet bloc in search of arms to restore balance of military power.

1956: Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal and closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping provokes joint

Israeli, British and French attack. Concerted US, USSR, and UN political action forces the countries to withdraw.

1964: Creation of PLO and Palestinian Liberation Army.

1967 (June): Six-Day War. Egypt's removal of the UN emergency force (which had been stationed on Egyptian-Israeli border since the conclusion of 1956 war) is viewed by Israel as an act of aggression. To preempt an Arab invasion, Israel attacks first and virtually annihilates the air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq and also enjoys decisive land victories on all three fronts. Israel captures the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Golan Heights, and Gaza strip. Israel annexes East Jerusalem.

1967 (August): Khartoum Summit; heads of Arab states decide to seek a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (rather than a renewed war) based on the principle of the "three no's": no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.

1967 (November): UN Security Council Resolution 242 passes. General Assembly votes to censure Israel for its annexation of East Jerusalem.

1967-1968: Initial period of UN resolutions censuring Israel for its massive reprisal raids, violation of human rights in the occupied territories, and establishing Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

1969-1970: Degeneration of cease-fire on Suez front into War of Attrition with frequent military raids and air battles. Failure of UN mediating mission and US proposals (Johnson Plan and Rogers Plan) to achieve peace on basis of Resolution 242. Egypt's Anwar Sadat responds positively to those initiatives; while the Roger's plan does not produce a Middle East peace, it ends the War of Attrition.

1970-1971: King Hussein ejects PLO forces from Jordan after a year long military confrontation.

1973: Israel wins Yom Kippur War after Egypt and Syria launch surprise attack. UN Security Council Resolution 338 passes to decree a cease-fire and calls upon the parties to immediately implement UN Resolution 242.

1975 (September): Secretary of State Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" achieves the Second Sinai Disengagement between Israel and Egypt and helps lay the groundwork for the Camp David Accords.

1975 (November): UN General Assembly Resolution passes defining Zionism as racism.

1978 (March): Israel invades southern Lebanon to destroy fedayeen who outnumber opposing Christian Lebanese militia. Fedayeen's killing of 34 Israeli citizens in northern Israel causes the invasion. Israeli forces withdraw in June under US and UN pressure.

1978 (September): Camp David Accords signed between Egypt and Israel, encompassing two frameworks; the first between Israel and Egypt (which was implemented) and the second to focus on the Gaza strip and West Bank (which was not).

1978 (October): Prime Minister Begin of Israel announces that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories will increase, thereby violating President Carter's verbal understanding that settlements should be halted during a five-year transition period.

1980: Israel reaffirms annexation of East Jerusalem.

1981: Israel annexes Golan Heights.

1982 (June): Israel invades Lebanon a second time to end Palestinian attacks on Israeli territory and civilians and to establish a regime in Lebanon sympathetic to Israel. This leads to the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon into other Arab states.

1982 (September): President Reagan's peace plan--to reaffirm the non-implemented framework of the Camp David Accords--is rejected by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his Likud administration as well as by the PLO and Arab states.

1987: Intifada begins in the West Bank and Gaza strip.

1988 (July): King Hussein severs Jordan's administrative and legal ties to the West Bank.

1988 (December): Yasir Arafat addresses a special session of the UN General Assembly in Geneva. By renouncing terrorism, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, and accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338, Arafat satisfies American conditions for reversing its thirteen-year policy of excluding the PLO from official negotiations.

1991 (April): Ariel Sharon, Minister of Housing under the Likud administration, announces plans to vigorously expand Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

1991 (November): Middle East peace talks begin.

1991 (December): UN repeals Zionism resolution.

1992 (June): Labor party wins Knesset elections and ends Likud's hardline administration and aggressive settlement policies; Israeli public sends a clear mandate for peace.

1992 (November): Draft Jordanian-Israeli agreement announced regarding substantive areas for discussion on security, water allocation, borders and arms control, within the principles of a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement.

1993 (June): Tenth round of peace talks are held in Washington DC.

1993 (July): Israeli air and ground forces bomb South Lebanon in retaliation for escalated terrorist attacks of citizens and security forces in border areas. The assault, termed the worst since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, forces about 400,000 Arabs to evacuate toward Beirut. Prime Minister Rabin hopes to not only destroy guerrilla operational bases, but to pressure Lebanon and Syria, its patron, to control Hizbullah activities. A cease-fire is arranged by Secretary of State Christopher.

1993 (August): Major figures from the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks have threatened to quit if Yasir Arafat continues to control the substance of the talks. The delegates want to include the issue of East Jerusalem while Arafat is willing to delay this discussion, demonstrating PLO alignment with Israel on this matter.

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